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The Constitutionalization of
Fatherhood
Dara E. Purvis†
Abstract
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court heard a series of
challenges to family law statutes brought by unwed biological fathers,
questioning the constitutionality of laws that treated unwed fathers
differently than unwed mothers. The Court’s opinions created a starkly
different constitutional status for unwed fathers than for unwed
mothers, demanding additional actions and relationships before an
unwed father was considered a constitutional father.
Although state parentage statutes have progressed beyond their
1970s incarnations, the doctrine created in those family law cases
continues to have impact far beyond family law. Transmission of
citizenship in the context of immigration law and the inheritance rights
of children of unwed parents whose fathers died without a will echo the
reasoning of the family law cases, including two unwed-father principles
giving legal imprimatur to stereotypes about fathers. Across multiple
areas of law, therefore, unwed fathers are not constitutional fathers.
It is not enough, however, to simply revive past challenges to such
statutes: separate criticisms of each line of cases have not prompted
reconsideration of the cases reforming family law, immigration law, or
inheritance law individually. This Article identifies a new approach
using modern precedents to provide a clearer theory of
constitutionalizing fathers: Obergefell v. Hodges illustrates a
methodology of analyzing claims that involve the unequal application
of a fundamental right, and Sessions v. Morales-Santana provides the
substantive rejection of gendered, parental stereotypes that fills out
Obergefell’s framework. The result is an unambiguous argument rooted
in the Equal Protection Clause that will constitutionalize fathers across
the law.
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Introduction
When is a biological father not a constitutional father? The answer
is surprisingly simple: when he is unmarried. Unwed biological fathers
are not parents under constitutional doctrine as outlined by the
Supreme Court until they take actions far beyond those required of
unwed biological mothers.
Such unwed biological fathers may be legal fathers under state law
identifying legal parents, so one might think that this gendered
approach to constitutional parentage has been effectively mooted
through legislative reform. The Supreme Court’s approval of gendered
constitutional parental rights, however, extends into other areas of law
where those areas intersect with determinations of parentage. For
example, transmission of citizenship from one U.S. citizen parent does
not rely upon any individual state’s laws as to legal parentage, and the
gendered treatment of unwed fathers and mothers in family law cases
has been imported to justify gendered treatment of unwed fathers in
their ability to transmit American citizenship. Similarly, children who
claim inheritance from an unwed father who died without a will face
the same gendered logic imported from family law into inheritance law.
The result is that unwed biological fathers are not constitutional
fathers. Gender stereotypes about fathers in general have been used to
justify treating unwed fathers starkly differently than unwed mothers.
Previous challenges to such laws have used two different arguments:
first, that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental right; and
second, that such differential treatment violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The challenges were largely unsuccessful, in part because courts
used gender stereotypes positing that fathers and mothers are situated
differently at birth to answer both claims, even as society and medical

542

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood

technology have developed in ways that fundamentally undercut such
stereotypes.
Modern caselaw, however, provides a clearer approach. Obergefell
v. Hodges1 addressed an argument involving the combination of due
process and equal protection issues, in which the fundamental right of
marriage was unequally made available according to the gender of the
spouses. The case demonstrates a methodology for such joint claims,
focusing attention upon the message and effect of the unequal
application of a fundamental right. Furthermore, Sessions v. MoralesSantana,2 which assessed a statute related to the transmission of
citizenship, provides the substantive evidence of the unconstitutional
stereotypes upon which gendered parental status relies.
Gendered treatment of unwed parents is unconstitutional, most
clearly so under the Equal Protection Clause. This Article demonstrates
the harm of the existing constitutional doctrine and outlines a path to
addressing it. Part I addresses the family law treatment of unwed
parenthood; it describes both the statutory definitions of legal
parenthood and Supreme Court cases approving of a starkly different
constitutional parental right for unwed fathers and mothers. This Part
also traces the development of the unwed-father principles to two key
assumptions about fathers and mothers upon which family law and
other fields rely. Part II illustrates the impact of family law
constitutional doctrine upon other areas of law, using the examples of
transmission of citizenship and intestate inheritance rights to show the
ongoing effects of the earlier family law cases. In particular, the unwedfather principles are cited again and again outside of family law to
justify continued gendered treatment of unwed fathers. Part III outlines
how to equalize treatment of unwed fathers and mothers and
constitutionalize fathers, using Obergefell v. Hodges and Sessions v.
Morales-Santana to map out a modern understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause’s application to parentage statutes.

I.

Equal Protection Issues in the Law of Parentage

Status as a legal parent is an odd legal creation in many ways. Most
of the time, it is established through a largely invisible, uncontested,
and informal process, although it is one of the most significant legal
statuses that a person can hold. The methods and rules by which a
person either self-identifies or is identified by a court as a parent are
set by state statutes, yet one of the oldest fundamental rights identified
by the Supreme Court is the fundamental right inherent in the parentchild relationship.3 This Part outlines some of the statutory paths to
1.

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

2.

137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).

3.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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parenthood, then explains why the constitutional status of parenthood
is completely different than the statutory paths. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed different constitutional paths
to parenthood for mothers and fathers. By approving starkly different
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers, the Supreme Court has
labeled unwed fathers non-constitutional parents lacking constitutional
rights and status.
A.

The Progressive Nature of Statutory Parenthood

Every state has statutes defining legal parentage, specifying
multiple ways in which an adult could assert their status as a legal
parent to a specific child. The ways that an adult might claim status
as a parent have multiplied in recent decades due to state legislatures
adding new rules in a sedimentary process as the social acceptance of
families and new fertility technologies developed. While parentage
statutes have been generally progressive, the process of individually
revising state laws results in some variety among states as to who is a
legal parent; particularly in newer contexts such as surrogacy,4 as well
as contexts in which multiple rules identify multiple parents.5
The oldest rule is the most common-sense rule of thumb: a woman
giving birth is the mother of that child.6 The marital presumption adds
to identification of the mother; it establishes that when a child is born
to a married woman, her husband is the legal father.7 Because of the
historical stigma against illegitimacy, the marital presumption was
applied very broadly, even in circumstances where the husband’s
biological paternity was unlikely.8 This also made sense in a world
lacking reliable and accessible genetic tests, as presumably most of the
time the marital presumption could serve as a proxy for genetic
4.

See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24
Yale J.L. & Feminism 210, 232–34 (2012).

5.

The vast majority of states cap the number of legal parents at two,
meaning that if parentage statutes identify more than two possible legal
parents, a further winnowing must take place. California, however,
recently enacted legislation allowing a child to have more than two legal
parents, meaning that the multiple rules of parentage can result in three
or more parents. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 7612(c) (2017).

6.

This is a bit of an oversimplification at the modern and ancient ends;
today, this rule is complicated with the development of surrogacy, and
historically a child born to an unmarried woman was filius nullius, or the
legal child of no one. See Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its
Discontents: Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 2037,
2043 (2016).

7.

Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption
of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 227, 232–
34 (2006).

8.

See id.
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fatherhood. As the availability of genetic tests expanded, however,
states retained the marital presumption and added proof of genetic
connection as another method to establish parentage.9
Reforms over the last few decades have complicated the picture
even further. As it became more common for people to use donated
sperm and eggs in the process of having children, states added
provisions to their laws to establish that donors who used the services
of fertility clinics or other medical professionals to provide their
donations were excluded from the possibility of being identified as legal
parents, along with the attendant responsibilities such as child
support.10 Similarly, as the use of surrogates to carry pregnancies to
term became more widely available and utilized, some states established
rules regarding whether surrogates would be identified or excluded from
status as legal parents.11 There are thus multiple entrances to the status
of legal parent (giving birth, the marital presumption, genetic
connection, etc.), as well as possible exits from that status (if the
potential parent worked with a fertility clinic or other medical
professional to donate gametes or serve as a surrogate).
This reformation process, while significant, remains incomplete and
ongoing. For example, some of the most notable current proposed
changes appear in the most recent revisions to the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA),12 drafted to serve as a model statute for state legislatures.
The 2017 UPA makes a variety of progressive steps—notably, it
eliminates gender as it appeared in the previous UPA, equalizing the
treatment of men and women as they are identified as mothers and
fathers.13 Such amendments are a significant step, but will not change
statutes overnight. The UPA is used only as a model for state
legislatures and is not itself binding law.
Additionally, an important counterweight to reform efforts is the
lasting effect of gender stereotypes. When state legislatures are
considering whether to reform parentage statutes, societal expectations
about parents and gender roles sometimes work against proposed
amendments.14 Because parentage statutes originated at a time that
9.

David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 Am. J.
Comp. L. 125, 125̄–26 (2006).

10.

Id. at 134.

11.

Purvis, supra note 4, at 232–34.

12.

Unif. Parentage Act (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.
State Laws 2017).

13.

Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127
Yale L.J. F. 589, 592 (2018).

14.

Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 Yale L.J. 2260, 2268
(2017).
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contemplated only heterosexual parents,15 parentage laws were built
upon stereotypes about the gendered nature of parenthood, in which
mothers are the first and closest parent.16 As Douglas NeJaime recently
described, this stereotype views mothers as “the parental figure who
establishes the family,” whereas fathers are “a secondary, optional
parent, potentially supplementing but certainly not replacing the
mother.”17
Such stereotypes are not necessarily consciously incorporated, and
sometimes rules that grew from gender stereotypes can have progressive
effects in modern contexts. The marital presumption provides a good
example of the complex push and pull of statutory reform. On the one
hand, broader application of the marital presumption can have a
liberalizing effect. Applying the marital presumption to same-sex
couples may break the presumption away from the historical foundation
of heterosexual couples and convert the rule into a source of
nonbiological parenthood.18 On the other hand, Clare Huntington has
pointed out that the continued vitality of marital family law “wreaks
havoc” on nonmarital families who are governed by completely different
rules.19 Huntington argues:
[T]o put married and unmarried parents on level playing ground,
it is essential to disrupt the formal relationship between marriage
and parental rights. The most direct way to do so is to eliminate
the marital presumption. This legal rule is a shortcut that was
originally designed to promote marital harmony and protect
children from being rendered illegitimate. But at a time when
illegitimacy carries little legal stigma, the marital presumption
unnecessarily privileges marital families at the expense of
nonmarital families.20

As a result of the incomplete process of reform, many scholars have
proposed additional modifications to existing parentage laws. Martha
Fineman has suggested focusing on the importance of the parent-child
dyad, rather than the horizontal relationship between parents.21 Others
15.

Id. at 2323.

16.

Id. at 2328–29.

17.

Id. at 2329.

18.

See Douglas NeJaime, The Family’s Constitution, 32 Const. Comment.
413, 438–39 (2017).

19.

Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 171 (2015).

20.

Id. at 225 (citations omitted).

21.

See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother,
the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies
(1995).
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proposals center on the act of caregiving more generally, without such
a strong focus on genetic connections.22 Clare Huntington and Merle
Weiner argue that a better state goal would be to facilitate coparenting, either completely separated from any marital or romantic
relationship23 or encouraging co-parents to try to remain in a romantic
relationship and treating the parent-partner relationship as legally
significant.24
Underlying all parentage statutes are constitutional rights. One is
the fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of one’s
children.25 Another is the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of equal
treatment under the law, applied with heightened scrutiny to laws that
treat men and women differently.26 Even as parentage statutes progress,
they are undergirded by a constitutional law doctrine that is slower to
evolve. The next section addresses the gendered nature of parental
constitutional rights, identifying unwed mothers as constitutional
mothers long before unwed fathers gain commensurate status as
constitutional fathers.
B.

The Unequal Nature of Constitutional Parenthood

Even as legal parentage is recognized and arguably created by state
law, there is a fundamental substantive due process constitutional right
inherent in parentage, and choices about when to become a parent must
not violate principles of equal protection.27 Both constitutional rights
are implicated in the treatment of unwed biological fathers, whose
status as legal and constitutional parents has been particularly
unclear.28 Historically, unwed biological fathers had no legal tie to their
children.29 By the mid-twentieth century this had changed, at least to
22.

See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 189 (2007); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy,
11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 307 (2004).

23.

See Huntington, supra note 19, at 173.

24.

See generally Merle H. Weiner, A Parent-Partner Status for
American Family Law (2015); see also Dara E. Purvis, A ParentPartner Status for American Family Law by Merle H. Weiner, 31
Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 378, 379–80 (2016) (book review).

25.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000).

26.

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).

27.

See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 Fam.
L.Q. 529, 533–34 (2008) (discussing the Court’s recognition of several
constitutional rights related to family law and recounting the Equal
Protection Clause’s bearing on family law).

28.

See Joanna L. Grossman, Constitutional
Comment. 307, 314–15 (2017).

29.

See Baker, supra note 6, at 2043 (“A child born to a woman without a
legally recognized partner was filius nullius, a child of no one.”).
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the extent that unwed mothers could seek declarations of parentage and
child support from the biological fathers.30 Society also began to change,
such that many unwed fathers chose to maintain relationships with
their children. State statutes, however, did not reform to keep pace with
societal evolution, nor were increases in unwed mothers’ ability to
impose responsibility on unwed fathers accompanied by increases in the
ability of unwed fathers to voluntarily shoulder that responsibility with
legal parental status. In the 1970s, a series of unwed fathers challenged
such state laws, asserting that gendered laws violated the Equal
Protection Clause and failure to provide avenues for unwed fathers to
assert parental rights violated the Due Process Clause. The Supreme
Court issued decidedly mixed opinions, leading to a modern doctrine
that condones significant differences in the constitutional status of
mothers and fathers.
The first case arose in Illinois, where Peter Stanley fathered three
children with Joan Stanley. The two were in a romantic relationship
for almost two decades, and lived together intermittently.31 At the time,
Illinois law provided that the children of an unmarried woman became
wards of the state if the mother died.32 Even though Peter Stanley had
been in his children’s lives as a father, the law meant that after Joan
died the children were taken into the custody of the state, which
appointed guardians for the children rather than allowing the children
to live with their father.33
Stanley argued that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection
Clause due to its unequal treatment of unmarried fathers as compared
to married fathers and unmarried mothers, who did not similarly lose
custody of their children if their co-parent died.34 Other parents only
lost custody if the State showed that they were unfit parents through
a child protective action, which gave a parent notice and an opportunity
to argue that they were fit to retain custody at a hearing.35 By contrast,
Illinois presumed that all unwed fathers were unfit parents.36
Although Stanley consistently presented his case as a challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court instead

30.

See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families:
The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family,
2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 319, 327–28 (2012).

31.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 650.

36.

Id.
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analyzed his claim under the Due Process Clause.37 The difference
meant that rather than compare unmarried fathers to other parents
(and ask whether a constitutionally salient difference existed between
the groups), the Court asked whether unwed fathers had any
constitutional interest that required some process before Illinois could
take the interest away. Justice White’s opinion for the Court answered
immediately that unwed fathers did hold a constitutional interest,
speaking generally of the importance of the family38 and more
specifically of the interest of a father in “children he has sired and
raised.”39 Framing Stanley’s interest as a due process argument also
meant that White set Stanley’s interest in his relationship with his
children against the State’s interest in protecting the children of
Illinois.40 There was no alternative father available in the form of a
second man claiming to be the children’s father––indeed, the alternative
to Stanley was to place the children in the custody of the State, with
all the accompanying financial and bureaucratic costs.41 Furthermore,
Illinois’s interest was to protect children from the care of unfit parents,
which Justice White argued was not served by separating children from
fit parents.42 The Illinois statute furthered child protective goals only if
all unmarried fathers were unfit parents.43
Reduced to such an extreme summary, one might expect the Court
to conclude that such a far-reaching generalization about unwed fathers
was so inaccurate and demeaning that it violated principles of equal
protection. Justice White, however, took a more moderate tone:
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are
unsuitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is
such a parent and that his children should be placed in other
hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some
are wholly suited to have custody of their children.44

The Court’s opinion concluded that the administrative convenience
of assuming all unmarried fathers were unfit parents could not justify
denying Peter Stanley and similarly situated fathers a hearing as to
37.

Id. at 659–60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (making note of the discrepancy
between the legal theory argued by Stanley and the theory applied by the
Court).

38.

Id. at 650–52 (White, J., majority).

39.

Id. at 651.

40.

Id. at 652.

41.

See id. at 646.

42.

Id. at 652–53.

43.

Id. at 653.

44.

Id. at 654.
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parental fitness before taking their children into the custody of the
state.45 Justice White mentioned the Equal Protection Clause at the
very end of his opinion, noting that because all parents were entitled to
a hearing under the Due Process Clause to determine their fitness before
removing children from the home, denying a hearing to unwed fathers
(but not married fathers or unwed mothers) violated the Equal
Protection Clause.46
Chief Justice Burger dissented and focused on the difference
between married and unmarried fathers. Pointing out that Stanley had
framed his argument under the Equal Protection Clause,47 Burger
turned fully to the significant differences he saw between married and
unmarried fathers. Burger argued that marriage created “legally
enforceable rights and duties” between spouses and between parents
and children, and argued that Stanley failed to “seek the burdens” of
those legally enforceable duties by marrying Joan Stanley.48 The
“voluntary” method by which a man could secure legal status as parent
was to marry the mother of his children.49 Because Stanley had failed
to do so, he had demonstrated a lack of commitment to his children.50
Burger continued to explain the different rights of unmarried
mothers versus fathers in terms that the Court would repeat over and
over in later cases. The argument relies on two claims about the relative
roles of unwed mothers and fathers, which I will call the “unwed-father
principles.” Principle one has to do with how easily and immediately a
biological mother can be identified, versus how a biological father can
prove his genetic link. Burger argued that unmarried mothers were
immediately identifiable from the moment of giving birth, whereas
unmarried fathers had no similar and clear method of identification.51
“Many” unwed fathers, in Burger’s summary, might not even be aware
that they had fathered a child out of wedlock, so identifying such
fathers would involve tracking men down before administering a
paternity test.52 The first unwed-father principle is thus the biological
unwed-father principle, assuming that the biological mother-child
45.

Id. at 657–58.

46.

Id. at 658.

47.

Id. at 659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

48.

Id. at 663–64.

49.

Id. at 664.

50.

Id. at 667. There is some evidence that Chief Justice Burger’s concern
regarding Peter Stanley as a father was justified. See Josh Gupta-Kagan,
Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 773,
781 (2016).

51.

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

52.

Id.
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relationship is easy to prove, and the biological father-child relationship
much more difficult.
The second unwed-father principle voices a stereotype of fathers as
uninvolved parents who are likely to evade responsibility and avoid
creating a relationship with their child: the stereotype unwed-father
principle. Burger cited “common human experience” for the proposition
that “the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant
creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds
resulting from the male’s often casual encounter.”53 Records from the
case indicate that Burger’s dissent chose more moderate language than
other Justices––Justice Douglas initially drafted an opinion that
described Stanley and other unwed fathers as “hit-and-run drivers.”54
Burger argued that the commitment-free status of unmarried fathers
was enough to reject Stanley’s challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause, using gender stereotypes about men and fathers to reject an
equality-based argument.
Despite Peter Stanley’s ostensible victory before the Supreme
Court, the case is not a full-throated defense of unwed fathers. The
decision vindicated the right of all parents to be granted a minimal
amount of due process before losing custody of their children but
underscored that the generalization that unwed fathers do not care for
their children may be true. Additionally, the case was decided by a
seven-member Court, which at the end of the initial conference reached
a very different decision: four Justices would have dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, with one dissenter who wanted to
rule for Illinois and two who wanted to rule for Stanley.55 A series of
vote switches resulted in Justice White’s decision ruling nominally in
favor of Stanley, but no clear majority existed that seemed willing to
support the rights of unwed fathers in later cases.56 Finally, the primary
discussion of Stanley’s equal protection claims occurred in dissents
arguing that no equal protection violation occurred, laying out the
unwed-father principles, and voicing clear gendered stereotypes about
fathers.57
A few years later, a pair of cases demonstrated the Court’s weak
conception of the constitutional rights of unwed fathers. The first was
Quilloin v. Walcott,58 decided in 1978. Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott
had a child together in December 1964, but never lived together, and
53.

Id.

54.

Gupta-Kagan, supra note 50, at 793.

55.

Id. at 798.

56.

See id. at 798–802.

57.

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663–67 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

58.

434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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their romantic relationship did not continue for long.59 Ardell married
Randall Walcott in 1967, and the child lived with Ardell and Randall
from that point on.60 Quilloin had a relationship with his child, but
provided support irregularly, and as the child’s relationship with
Randall Walcott strengthened, Ardell decided that Quilloin’s visits with
the child were disrupting the Walcott family and the child in
particular.61 Additionally, Randall Walcott wished to formally adopt
the child,62 and the child agreed that he wanted to be adopted and to
have the last name Walcott.63
Randall Walcott filed a petition to adopt the child in 1976, which
Quilloin opposed, filing a petition to be legitimated as the child’s father,
an objection to the adoption petition, and a request for visitation
rights.64 Had Quilloin and Ardell Walcott been married when their child
was born, Quilloin would have had to consent or otherwise surrender
his parental rights in order for Randall Walcott’s adoption petition to
be approved.65 Under Georgia state law, however, adoption of a child
born to unmarried parents needed only the mother’s approval, and not
the father’s.66 Quilloin argued that this unequal requirement of parental
consent violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.67
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected both
arguments. The Court agreed that taking children away from “a natural
family” without a demonstration that the parents were unfit would
violate the Due Process Clause.68 The Court implicitly criticized
Quilloin’s role as father, however, by noting that he had never
petitioned to be recognized as the child’s legal father before, nor had he
previously requested visitation or custody.69 Furthermore, the child
would not be removed from Quilloin’s care and placed in the custody
of strangers, as with Peter Stanley’s children. Instead, the child would
remain living with Randall and Ardell Walcott, who had been raising
the child for many years together, “a result desired by all concerned,
59.

Id. at 247.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 251.

62.

See id. at 247.

63.

Id. at 251.

64.

Id. at 247, 249–50.

65.

Id. at 248.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 252.

68.

Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–
63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).

69.

Id.
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except [Quilloin].”70 Justice Marshall did not explain why Quilloin’s
fundamental parentage right would vary according to the alternative
custody option available for his child, other than noting that “the result
of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit
already in existence.”71 Randall Walcott, by voluntarily assuming the
responsibilities of parenthood and legally binding himself to the child’s
mother, was apparently in the eyes of the Court a better father than
Quilloin.
Quilloin’s Equal Protection Clause argument fared no better. He
argued that he should have the same ability to veto an adoption by
withholding his consent as a married father, a divorced father, or an
unwed mother could, and to give unwed fathers less power over
adoptions of their children did not give him equal protection of the
laws.72 Again the Court disagreed, focusing on Quilloin’s failure to
assume the quotidian responsibilities of parenthood by implicitly
invoking the second-stereotype unwed-father principle. Having “never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,”73 the Court
reasoned, he was properly distinguished from a married father, who
would have been engaged in a child’s daily care. Because Quilloin’s
individual relationship with his child did not resemble that of the
hypothetical, stereotypical married father, Quilloin’s unwed fatherhood
was saliently different than, and inferior to, married fatherhood and
could thus be constitutionally treated differently by Georgia law. The
somewhat implicit skepticism towards unwed fathers generally
expressed in Stanley thus found an individual example, and more
explicit expression, in the Court’s criticism of Quilloin. Even though he
had provided support to his child and had a relationship with his child,
Quilloin’s commitment to his child was not the same as Randall
Walcott’s commitment to the family through marriage to Ardell.
Quilloin’s unwed fatherhood was fundamentally inferior to Randall
Walcott’s married fatherhood.
Only one year later, however, the Court faced a case with another
unwed father whose relationship with his child was even stronger.
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together for five years, and
although they never married, apparently told others that they were
spouses.74 During the time that they lived together, they had two
70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id. at 252.

73.

Id. at 256.

74.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). Caban and Mohammed
could not legally marry at the time of their relationship, as Caban was
separated from a wife who he did not divorce until 1974. Id.
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children. Caban was listed as the father on the birth certificate for both
children, and the four lived together as a family until the end of 1973.
At that point, Maria Mohammed moved out with the children to live
with Kazim Mohammed, who she married the next month.75 Every
weekend Maria Mohammed brought the two children to visit her
mother, who lived in the same building as Caban, and the grandmother
allowed Caban to visit the children each week. These visits continued
for nine months, until the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico, taking
the two children with her at Mohammed’s request.76 The next year,
Caban visited the children in Puerto Rico, where he took them for what
the grandmother believed would be a short visit.77 Instead, Caban took
the children back home with him to New York.78 Mohammed then filed
for custody in New York state court.79
As the custody fight between Mohammed and Caban progressed,
both sides filed a petition for a second parent adoption by each parent’s
new partner: the Mohammeds, with stepfather Kazim Mohammed
seeking to adopt, and the Cabans, with Abdiel’s new wife Nina as the
potential new mother.80 As in Quilloin, New York law required the
consent of an unwed mother for any adoption petition of her children,
thus preventing Nina Caban’s petition from proceeding.81 Similarly,
New York did not require the consent of an unwed father to approve
the adoption of his children, but the unwed father was entitled to speak
at a hearing evaluating the proposed adoption.82 The hearing, however,
was not as to his own status as a parent or whether he was a good
father with rights to his children—instead, the hearing asked simply
whether it was in the best interests of a child to be adopted by the
prospective adoptive parents.83 A Surrogate for a New York Family
Court thus heard evidence presented by Caban, but only to the extent
that Caban spoke to Kazim Mohammed’s qualifications as a prospective
father, and granted Mohammed’s petition.84 Following Quilloin, Caban

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 383.

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

See id.

81.

Id. at 384.

82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 386–87.

84.

Id. at 384.
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argued that this process violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.85
In a sharp departure from previous cases, a 5–4 Court held that it
was “clear that [New York law] treats unmarried parents differently
according to their sex.”86 Caban is the only unwed father case in which
the Supreme Court found an equal protection violation as the
dispositive holding. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rejected
the distinction as the Quilloin Court characterized it, between unwed
fathers and other parents (including married fathers, married mothers,
and unmarried mothers).87 Instead, Powell wrote that the relevant
distinction was between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers,
meaning that in order to withstand Caban’s challenge, New York’s law
must withstand intermediate scrutiny.88
New York argued that its different treatment of unwed mothers
and fathers was substantially related to an important state interest
because the law recognized the “fundamental difference” between
mothers and fathers embodied in the second-stereotype unwed-father
principle, that a biological mother is simply closer to her child than a
biological father.89 The majority opinion in Caban rejected this
argument, but crucially did not reject the stereotype unwed-father
principle altogether. Instead, the Court relied on the individual
circumstances of Abdiel Caban. The Court found that Caban’s history
“demonstrate[d] that an unwed father may have a relationship with his
children fully comparable to that of the mother.”90 The Court spoke
approvingly of Caban’s role supporting and caring for his children,
particularly as they “lived together as a natural family for several
years.”91 Powell thus rejected the proposition of a “universal difference
between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s
development.”92 Notably, however, the Court mentioned that Caban’s
children were four and six years old by the time the adoption petitions
were filed, meaning that Caban had cared for them and stood in a role
very similar to that of a married father for a significant portion of their
85.

Id. at 385.

86.

Id. at 388.

87.

Id. at 393–94.

88.

Id. at 388 (reiterating the intermediate scrutiny standard from Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), that “Gender-based distinctions ‘must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives’”).

89.

Id.

90.

Id. at 389.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. (emphasis added).

555

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood

lives.93 Even as the Court rejected the universal stereotype, it
acknowledged a possibility that the stereotype could be true at certain
ages, specifically mentioning newborn infants versus older children.94
Two Justices wrote dissents, and both argued that differences
between unwed mothers and fathers justified different treatment under
New York law. Justice Stewart explained that even though the Equal
Protection Clause triggered heightened scrutiny for at least some sexbased classifications, “gender-based classifications are not invariably
invalid. When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the
area covered by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection Clause
is not violated.”95 He viewed parenthood as an area in which men and
women were fundamentally differently situated according to the first
biological unwed-father principle: the parental relationship of a mother
who gave birth to a child was clear, whereas a father’s status as parent
had to be demonstrated through other methods.96 Stewart argued that
both the physical and social realities that women were immediately
identified as a parent justified granting unwed mothers greater power
to veto potential adoption of their child.97
Justice Stevens agreed with this analysis in his own dissent, which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined.98 Stevens focused on
the mother’s unilateral power during pregnancy––she could decide
whether to terminate the pregnancy without interference or input from
the biological father, and controlled his later parental status by
choosing whether to tell the biological father that she was pregnant and
deciding whether to marry the biological father during her pregnancy.99
Echoing Stewart, Stevens reasoned that the mother would be
immediately identified as a parent at birth, and would almost certainly
have custody of the child from that moment.100 Given that the mother
had already been making decisions about the child from the moment of
conception, Stevens argued that New York’s law merely reflected the
existing state of affairs in which the mother was the primary and
perhaps only decisionmaker as to the child’s care.101
Although Abdiel Caban was successful before the Supreme Court,
he won by a razor-thin majority. Stevens’ dissent acknowledged that
93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

96.

Id. at 398–99.

97.

Id. at 399.

98.

Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

99.

Id. at 404–05.

100. Id. at 405.
101. Id. at 406.
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Caban’s longstanding relationship with his children could make Caban
an exception to the unwed-father principles rather than a rule that
unwed fathers should have rights coextensive with unwed mothers.102
Justice Stevens’s dissent observing that unwed mothers already had
control over the relationship between unwed fathers and children was
prophetic, as demonstrated in the 1983 case Lehr v. Robertson.103
Jonathan Lehr had been living with Lorraine Robertson for about two
years when Lorraine gave birth to their daughter Jessica.104 When
Lorraine was discharged from the hospital after birth, she fled with
Jessica and concealed her location from Lehr.105 Lehr eventually hired
a detective agency to locate Jessica and Lorraine, who by that time had
married Richard Robertson.106 Lehr claimed that Lorraine refused to
allow him to contact Jessica, rejected his attempts to provide child
support, and filed an adoption petition to allow Richard Robertson to
adopt Jessica.107 The petition was approved a few months later, and
Lehr later filed a lawsuit challenging the adoption.108
Under New York law, Lehr was not entitled even to notice of the
adoption proceeding. Several categories of potential unwed fathers were
notified if an adoption petition was filed concerning their child: men
who had entered themselves into the state putative father registry, men
who were listed as the father on a child’s birth certificate, men living
with the mother and representing themselves as the father in public
after the child’s birth, and others.109 Lehr did not fit into any of the
categories, so received neither notice of the adoption nor an opportunity
to be heard at the adoption proceeding.110 As with previous appellants,
Lehr argued that this unconstitutionally infringed upon his
fundamental relationship with Jessica under the Due Process Clause,
and that treating unwed fathers differently than unwed mothers and
married fathers violated the Equal Protection Clause.111
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court and rejected both
arguments. Regarding Lehr’s argument that he had a fundamental right
as to his relationship with Jessica, Stevens drew a line between Stanley
102. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
104. Id. at 268–69 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 269.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 250, 255 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 250–51.
110. Id. at 251–52.
111. Id. at 249–50.
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and Caban on one side and Quilloin and Lehr on the other. Peter
Stanley and Abdiel Caban had existing parental relationships with their
children, created through everyday caregiving and commitment to the
child over the passage of time.112 Stevens wrote that when such a father
“demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood”
by helping to raise his child, “his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”113
Fathers such as Jonathan Lehr or Leon Quilloin, however, who failed
to step up and care for their children, who lacked an emotional
relationship in addition to a biological one, did not hold a fundamental
right.
It was irrelevant, apparently, that Lehr had been prevented from
creating such a relationship by Lorraine Robertson; most of the facts
explaining that she had fled with Jessica appeared only in Justice
White’s dissent. The dissent argued that because Lehr had never been
allowed to present a factual case, the Court should have assumed that
his rendition of the facts was accurate, “that but for the actions of the
child’s mother there would have been the kind of significant relationship
that the majority concedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural
due process protections.”114 In Justice Stevens’s eyes, by contrast, Lehr
had failed to take what actions he could, even in Lorraine and Jessica’s
absence, such as placing his name on New York’s putative father
registry.115 In the context of Lehr’s equal protection challenge, the Court
referred to the same perceived difference between mothers and fathers
that previous cases described: unwed mothers and fathers were not
“similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child,” so
the Constitution did not mandate equal treatment.116
The Court’s opinion focused, as it did in previous cases, on the
individual circumstances of Jonathan Lehr, albeit only to a point. It
was constitutionally significant, even determinative, that Lehr did not
have a substantial relationship with Jessica: because he had not acted
like a father, he had no rights of a father. This context, however, did
not stretch to the reason that Lehr had not created such a relationship,
which, at least by his account, was that Lorraine had knowingly
prevented any relationship from the beginning.117 But at least to some

112. Id. at 261.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 270–71 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 264 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 267–68.
117. Lorraine may well have had good reasons for doing so—for example, one
could speculate that Lorraine fled an abusive relationship in order to
protect Jessica. Justice White’s dissent is correct, however, that neither
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readers, it seemed clear that if an unwed father had acted like a father
and created a relationship with his child through caregiving and
providing support, the Court would recognize that the father had a
fundamental right in that relationship.
A few years later, the Court placed a large asterisk on that
proposition. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,118 an even more dramatic and
complex set of adult relationships circled around a child’s parentage.
The mother was Carole D., married to Gerald D.119 Carole had an
extramarital affair with Michael H., which resulted in the birth of
Victoria in 1981.120 Carole and Gerald entered Gerald’s name on
Victoria’s birth certificate as the father, and Gerald always presented
Victoria publicly as his own child.121 Michael knew, however, shortly
after Victoria’s birth that he was likely the biological father, which was
later confirmed by a blood test.122
Carole moved with Victoria several times in the next few years,
reflecting what relationship Carole was in: they lived for significant
periods of time with Michael, during which time he treated Victoria as
his daughter and presented her as such publicly, but Carole and
Victoria also lived with Gerald during attempts to reconcile, as well as
with a third man with whom Carole also had a relatively brief
relationship.123 During one of the times when Carole lived with Michael,
they both signed a stipulation that he was Victoria’s father, but Carole
left Michael the next month and told her attorneys not to file the
stipulation.124 Eventually Carole reconciled with Gerald, moved back in
with him on a long-term basis, and they had two children together.125
After Michael and Carole’s relationship ended, he began to seek
visitation rights with Victoria.126 Gerald intervened in the case and
argued that under California law, there were no triable issues of fact as
to Victoria’s paternity––Gerald was the legal father, so Michael had no

side had ever presented facts either substantiating Lehr’s story or
explaining Lorraine’s actions.
118. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
119. Id. at 113.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 113–14.
122. Id. at 114.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 114–15.
125. Id. at 115.
126. Id.
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right to ask for visitation.127 Gerald’s motion was granted, and Michael’s
challenges to it eventually worked their way up to the Supreme Court.
The underlying statute was California’s marital presumption,
providing that the child of a married woman living with her husband
was “conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage,” meaning
that husband and wife were legal father and mother.128 The presumption
could be overcome by introducing blood tests as evidence showing that
another man was the biological father, but only the husband or the
mother were empowered to introduce such evidence.129
Despite having such blood tests showing that he was Victoria’s
biological father, therefore, Michael had no way of introducing them
into evidence or otherwise disturbing the presumption that Gerald was
Victoria’s father. Michael argued that this violated the Due Process
clause, both as a procedural and substantive matter. The Court swiftly
rejected Michael’s procedural claim,130 and the vast majority of the
decision focused on Michael’s argument as to fundamental rights.
Michael’s argument was very predictable based on the precedent of
Lehr: he was the unwed biological father of Victoria, had voluntarily
taken on his role and responsibilities as her father, and had created a
substantial relationship with her. In his view, this placed him in the
same position as Stanley and Caban, holding a fundamental
constitutional right in his relationship with Victoria.131
Justice Scalia, writing for a 5–4 Court, disagreed. Scalia reasoned
that the fundamental parental right protected by the Constitution
protected “traditional” marital families, not families made up of unwed
(or adulterous) parents.132 He was particularly concerned that, as with
Quilloin and Lehr, Victoria had an alternative legal father in the form
of Gerald. Michael was not asserting a parental right over a child who
would otherwise lack a father; Michael’s claim would displace Gerald
from the marital family that existed at the time of Michael’s lawsuit.133
Presented with two alternative families, one where the parents were
split up and never married to each other, and another where the legal
father and mother were married and lived together as a unitary family,
Scalia concluded that “it is not unconstitutional for the State to give
categorical preference to the latter.”134
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (1989)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 119–21.
131. Id. at 123.
132. Id. at 125.
133. Id. at 123–24.
134. Id. at 129.
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Justice Brennan dissented, pointing to the Court’s past cases to
question why such importance was placed on the “only difference” of
Gerald’s marriage to Carole.135 Justice White, in a separate dissent that
Justice Brennan joined, asked, “in light of Carole’s vicissitudes, what
more could Michael have done?”136 White argued that the Court’s
discussion of the importance of an unwed biological father stepping
forward to take on the responsibilities of fatherhood could have been
directed at Michael, who followed their instructions—yet the Court
nonetheless rejected his constitutional argument.137
In the eyes of at least slim majorities of the Court, therefore, unwed
biological fathers have a significantly different constitutional status
than unwed biological mothers. The unwed-father principles justify
treating them differently than unwed mothers. Unwed biological
mothers hold decision-making power over their children from the
moment of conception and, as a physical and societal matter, are tasked
with their children’s care. This justifies, according to this line of cases,
immediately bestowing a fundamental constitutional right upon unwed
biological mothers. Unwed biological fathers, however, have additional
requirements before they have any cognizable constitutional interest.138
They must seek out and assume the responsibilities of fatherhood,
regardless of circumstances that might make that difficult or impossible.
They must create a substantial relationship with their child through
acting like a father, and ideally through acting like a husband, proving
that they are an exception to the second-stereotype unwed-father
principle.139 And they must not have become fathers through a
nontraditional or even illicit relationship, particularly if a “better” legal
father is willing and able to assume the role of legal father.
Furthermore, these same differences, embodied in the unwed-father
principles, justify rejecting almost all equal protection claims brought
by unwed fathers. The perceived differently situated unwed father is
justifiably treated differently under statutory law and by the
Constitution.
The Court’s treatment of the parentage claims of unwed biological
fathers clearly reflects gendered stereotypes regarding fathers versus
135. Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 160 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 163.
138. But see Jennifer Hendricks, who argues that the additional burden merely
equalizes the burden that a birth mother takes on in the form of pregnancy
and birth, requiring men to exhibit “parental behavior that is fairly basic,
yet appropriate to the facts of men’s biology.” Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Essentially A Mother, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 429, 444 (2007).
139. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 Am. U.
J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 387, 409 (2012).
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mothers. As Karen Czapanskiy famously put it, mothers are “draftees,”
whose parental status and responsibility is assumed, whereas fathers
are volunteers who only sign up at will.140 The flip side of parentage as
volunteerism, however, is that not all volunteers are welcome. Mothers
are viewed as natural, nurturing parents, whereas fathers lack innate
parenting skills.141
As I have previously written:
[Unwed biological fathers’ rights are] fundamentally relational,
turning either on his relationship with the biological mother or
with the child. The only way for a man to ensure parental rights
before birth is to marry the biological mother, a marriage-based
classification that the Supreme Court has explicitly held raises no
equal protection concerns. And the only way for an unwed man
to ensure parental rights after birth is to create a functional
relationship with the child, which is dependent on the biological
mother’s willingness to allow such a bond to develop.142

The Court is skeptical of unwed biological fathers both as partners
(or as failed spouses) and as fathers, citing stereotypical views of
masculinity and describing men as eager to evade parental
responsibilities.143 As discussed above, states have liberalized their
statutes such that it would be much easier for men in the position of
these appellants to be recognized as legal fathers. The constitutional
doctrine, however, remains approving of the starkly differential
treatment of mothers and fathers.
One reading of the different approach taken by statutes and
constitutional analysis is that state legislatures have secured the rights
of fathers such that the constitutional doctrine is mooted. In the most
superficial analysis of dispositions, this is correct, for example,
California amended its marital presumption statute following Michael
140. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1415, 1415–16 (1991); see also Nancy E.
Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing
Fathers, 54 Emory L.J. 1271 (2005).
141. Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 181, 184
(2000).
142. Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and
Fathers, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 645, 679 (2014); see also Murray, supra
note 139, at 409 (describing the Court as “anchored by a persistent
skepticism of non-marriage (and all of its consequences) and a persistent
veneration of marriage as the normative ideal for adult intimate life”).
143. Nancy Dowd has written extensively about how masculinities affect men
as fathers, pressuring them to see nurturing and emotional caregiving as
female (and thus unacceptable) characteristics. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd,
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y
201, 239 (2008).
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H. so that a man in Michael’s position would be able to introduce a
blood test showing biological fatherhood as evidence to support a
petition to establish his paternity.144
The constitutional analysis of parental rights incorporating the
unwed-father principles, however, reverberates through different areas
of the law, meaning that cases typically categorized as solely family law
cases impact the analysis of issues far outside the bounds of family law.
In this reading, the Supreme Court’s unaddressed history of parentage
cases in the 1970s and 1980s bolsters the constitutionality of gendered
statutes today, as states can point to constitutional analysis in the
context of family law to apply in the context of other areas. Crucially,
this exporting of family law doctrine is more likely applied to the equal
protection side of the cases, as a more attenuated link between
parentage and a legal right makes the fundamental right claim remote.
The next Part provides examples of the impact of family law
constitutionalism, where gendered identification of unwed parents helps
to determine the result in immigration, inheritance, and beyond.

II. Gendered Parenthood in Other Areas of Law
There are scores of contexts outside of family law where the
identification of family members plays an important role. Tax law
involves defining familial dependents, application of the marital
privilege in criminal law necessitates recognizing spouses, and some tort
claims may be brought only by certain family members.
In some contexts, the gendered classification of unwed parents in
family law has been imported—and more significantly, so has the
constitutional analysis of challenges to that gendered treatment of
parents. This Part discusses two of the most explicit examples of how
family law’s dismissal of the constitutional rights of unwed fathers has
been underscored in challenges to statutes well outside the ambit of
family law: immigration law, in the context of the transmission of
citizenship, and inheritance law, in the context of children inheriting
from unwed intestate parents.
A.

Immigration Law: Transmission of Citizenship

At its root, immigration law regulates the movement of people.
Because people often move with their families, regulating the movement
of people also implicitly regulates families. The gendered stereotypes

144. See Michael L. Oddenino, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Critical
Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
25 Fam. L.Q. 125, 135 (1991).
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regarding fathers and mothers are built into federal immigration law
from the ground up.145
Transmission of citizenship is one such area in which family law’s
gender stereotypes find an additional and more recent voice.146
American citizenship via birth can be acquired through two different
theories: jus soli, known as birthright citizenship, is the grant of
American citizenship to any person born on American land,147 whereas,
jus sanguinis is the grant of citizenship through the citizenship of a
child’s parents.148 This parent-dependent citizenship, however, has two
important aspects when considering the echoes of family law’s gendered
parental stereotypes. The first is that recognition as a parent for
purposes of transmitting citizenship can be different than recognition
as a parent under state-level family law.149 The second notable aspect
is that parent-dependent citizenship is explicitly gendered, as
transmission of citizenship depends on whether the Americancitizenship parent is a mother or a father.150
Although jus sanguinis citizenship has always depended on the
gender of the American-citizen parent, which parent can more easily
transmit citizenship has shifted over time in a way that demonstrates
how directly dominant gender stereotypes of a given time period are
incorporated into the law. Initially, in keeping with patriarchal
traditions, only fathers could transmit American citizenship to their
145. For examples of commentary upon the gendered aspects of family law and
immigration law, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s
Family Values, 100 Va. L. Rev. 629 (2014); Albertina Antognini, From
Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 Harv.
J. L. & Gender 405 (2013); Kelly, supra note 141; Caroline Rogus,
Comment, Conflating Women’s Biological and Sociological Roles: The
Ideal of Motherhood, Equal Protection, and the Implications of the
Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 803 (2003).
146. See Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The
Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L.
Rev. 1485, 1489 (2011) (“An important goal of the historians’ amicus
brief filed in Flores-Villar is to . . . explain[] how this ostensibly obscure
citizenship law is part of a larger historical phenomenon: the persistence
of gender-based sociolegal norms in determining citizenship.”).
147. Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal
Images, 51 Hastings L.J. 557, 565 (2000).
148. Id.
149. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 145, at 631–32.
150. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in MoralesSantana, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 170, 179 (2017) (describing the “deeply
gendered approach to parent-child citizenship transmission” as “just one
part of a complex set of family-based laws that structured entry and
political membership along familiar patrilineal lines”).
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children.151 Under coverture, women and children’s legal personhood
was subsumed within their husband or father’s, meaning that his
citizenship status became their own.152
After family law began to reject some of the principles of coverture
and exalt a domestic role for women as natural caregivers, immigration
law followed by tying children’s citizenship status to their mother
instead of their father.153 Today, it is the mother who can more easily
transmit citizenship, not the father.
In identifying who is eligible to transmit citizenship, federal statutes
have recognized the relationship between an unmarried mother and
child much earlier and much easier than the relationship between an
unmarried father and child. The Supreme Court has evaluated such
distinctions in several cases over the past few decades, and in all but
one has held that the challenged statutes do not violate the
Constitution. Moreover, the Court repeatedly echoes the same
arguments that appeared in family law’s constitutional doctrine:
mothers and fathers are differently situated with regard to identification
of their genetic relationship and how likely each parent is to have an
emotional relationship with their child.
One of the earliest cases arose in the 1970s, alongside the family
law cases discussed above. The case, Fiallo v. Bell,154 did not directly
address citizenship transmission, but the immigration status of close
family members of American citizens and lawful permanent residents.
The case was brought by three sets of unmarried biological fathers and
their children, challenging portions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 that defined “child.”155 The child of an American citizen or
lawful permanent resident would receive preferred status for
immigration purposes, but as the Court noted, “child” was defined very
specifically: “an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a
legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an
illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with
his natural mother.”156 An illegitimate child thus had no way of seeking
preference through his or her father. Similarly, the parents of an
American citizen or lawful permanent resident would receive
preferential status, but parents were identified using the same definition
151. See Rachel K. Alexander, Case Note, Nguyen v. INS: The Supreme Court
Rationalizes Gender-Based Distinctions in Upholding an Equal Protection
Challenge, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 789, 802 (2002); Kelly, supra note 147,
at 565.
152. Kelly, supra note 147, at 561.
153. See id. at 562, 568–71.
154. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
155. Id. at 788, 790.
156. Id. at 788.
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of “child.”157 The relationship between unwed biological fathers and
their illegitimate children, therefore, was not recognized for purposes of
immigration where an unwed biological mother’s relationship with her
illegitimate child was.
The plaintiffs argued that this refusal to recognize the parent-child
relationship between unwed fathers and children deprived them of equal
protection, due process, and association under the First, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments.158 The Supreme Court rejected all of these
arguments,159 and instead explained that the policy judgments
embodied in the immigration statutes were “entrusted exclusively to
the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial
authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the
Congress.”160 The Court speculated that “perhaps” Congress declined
to grant preferential status to the relationship between child and unwed
biological father for two familiar reasons repeated in the unwed-father
principles: the “serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity
determinations” and “a perceived absence in most cases of close family
ties” between unwed biological fathers and their children.161
The Court’s opinion did not offer significant analysis of the
gendered natures of these presumed justifications, although since the
decision was issued in 1977, it was written before almost all of the cases
that developed the current doctrine applying heightened scrutiny to
classifications based on sex.162 Even before a robust history of cases
discussing gender and equal protection, however, Justice Marshall’s
dissent clearly identified the gendered dimension to the statute as
problematic. He noted that the class of people denied the preferential
status was “defined on the basis of two traditionally disfavored
classifications—gender and legitimacy.”163 Justice Marshall also pointed
out a bizarre consequence to the inclusion of step-parent relationships:
an unmarried biological father could never be recognized as a parent
under the statute, but if he later married, his wife could qualify for the
preferential treatment as a step-parent.164

157. See id. at 789.
158. Id. at 790–91.
159. Id. at 799–800.
160. Id. at 798.
161. Id. at 799.
162. Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller
v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2 (1998).
163. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 811–12.
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It was not until two decades later that the Court next addressed a
challenge to gendered immigration laws in Miller v. Albright.165 The case
arose out of transmission of citizenship: Lorelyn Peñero Miller was born
in June 1970 in the Philippines to unmarried parents.166 Her mother was
Filipino and her father was American.167 Her father filed a petition in
1992 that resulted in a Voluntary Paternity Decree, establishing that
he was her father.168 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
however, because he established his paternity after she turned eighteen
years old, she was ineligible to receive American citizenship transmitted
through her parentage.169 Had the citizenship of her parents been
switched, such that her mother was the American citizen, the mother’s
American citizenship would have been transmitted to Miller at birth
without any need to take further steps to establish the mother/child
link.170 Miller argued that the differential requirements for fathers and
mothers violated the Fifth Amendment.171
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, rejected Miller’s
argument.172 The Court acknowledged that the transmission of
citizenship operated differently depending on the gender of the
American-citizen parent, requiring only children born to unmarried
citizen fathers to formally establish paternity before they reached the
age of eighteen.173 These differences, however, were “well supported by
valid governmental interests,” in the eyes of the plurality.174 The
differences are by now very familiar and precisely track the unwedfather principles laid out in the family law cases. First, it was an
important governmental objective to ensure that the child seeking
citizenship was in fact biologically related to an American citizen.175 In
support of this proposition, the Court cited Fiallo v. Bell and Trimble
v. Gordon,176 an inheritance case.177 If the child sought to show a
165. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
166. Id. at 424–25.
167. Id. at 425.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 426.
170. See id. at 424.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 420–21; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001) (describing
the multiple opinions in Miller).
173. Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 436.
176. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
177. Miller, 523 U.S. at 436; see also supra Part II.B.
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biological relationship to his or her mother, that was easy enough, as
the relationship to the birth mother was “immediately obvious.”178 By
contrast, the asserted relationship to the unmarried biological father
was unproven and could not be demonstrated through any other
contemporaneous public records.179 The requirement that the father
formally establish his paternity, therefore, merely established the
existence of an otherwise unproven claim to biological relationships.180
A biological relationship, however, could obviously be proven after
the child reached the age of eighteen. The second justification for the
law addressed the perceived need to establish the relationship while the
child was still a minor: “the interest in encouraging the development of
a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while
the child is a minor; and the related interest in fostering ties between
the foreign-born child and the United States.”181 In other words,
transmission of citizenship should take place where the Americancitizen parent has at least an opportunity to develop a relationship with
his or her child that would also transmit American culture and
American values.
It is here that the Court relies most on gendered stereotypes about
parenting. The opportunity to create a meaningful relationship, in the
Court’s eyes, is very different depending upon the gender of the parent:
When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States,
the citizen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of
her child’s existence and typically will have custody of the child
immediately after the birth. Such a child thus has the opportunity
to develop ties with its citizen mother at an early age, and may
even grow up in the United States if the mother returns. By
contrast, due to the normal interval of nine months between
conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even know
that his child exists, and the child may not know the father’s
identity.182

Congress, in the Court’s eyes, acted upon this gendered prediction
of the likelihood that fathers versus mothers would have the
opportunity to develop a relationship with their child. Congress
assumed that mothers have a relationship with children to whom they
give birth. Congress was not willing to extend any such assumption to

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 438.
182. Id.
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fathers, and so placed an additional requirement upon them to show
that they acknowledged their child while the child was still a minor.183
Notably, the Court explicitly relied upon its family law precedent
to conclude the additional burden placed upon unwed fathers was
constitutional, arguing that its logic was “directly supported” by Lehr
v. Robertson.184 The Court analogized unwed fathers attempting to
transmit citizenship to their biological children to unwed fathers
attempting to establish a legal relationship to their child under
domestic family law, setting Miller’s father alongside the father in
Lehr.185 The Court compared the burden upon both fathers, and found
the argument that Miller’s father faced an impermissibly higher
gendered burden “even less persuasive.”186 The father in Lehr was
deprived of his status as legal parent because he was unable to establish
his parenthood within about two years of the child’s birth, whereas the
father in Miller had eighteen years to do so.187
As in Lehr, the Court denied that the INA requirements rested
upon gender or gender stereotypes. The Court noted that transmission
of citizenship was regulated by more questions and requirements than
the gender of the American-citizen parent alone,188 and further denied
that it was the gender of the parent that actually mattered for purposes
of citizenship. The Court asserted that it was not “merely the sex of
the citizen parent,” but “an event creating a legal relationship between
parent and child” that determined eligibility for citizenship: the birth
alone for mothers, and post-birth establishment of paternity for
fathers.189 These differential requirements were justified by biological
differences, the Court argued, and not gender stereotypes.190
The Justices writing in dissent obviously disagreed, both objecting
to the Court’s reliance on gender stereotypes. Justice Ginsburg noted
that although the different requirements might be viewed as “a benign
preference, an affirmative action of sorts,”191 the differences were clearly
“based on generalizations (stereotypes) about the way women (or men)

183. Id. at 440.
184. Id. at 441.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. This logic somewhat elided the fact that Lehr addressed a claim
brought by the father, whereas in Miller only the child challenged the
statute, after her father was dismissed as a party. Id. at 426–27.
188. Id. at 442.
189. Id. at 443.
190. Id. at 444–45.
191. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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are.”192 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the mere language of the
Court’s opinion demonstrated this, as it “constantly relates and relies
on what ‘typically,’ or ‘normally,’ or ‘probably’ happens ‘often.’”193
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the INA’s distinctions between
mothers and fathers “depend for their validity upon the generalization
that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers to care for their
children, or to develop caring relationships with their children.”194 In
Justice Ginsburg’s view, Congress could have achieved its purpose of
“assuring close ties to the United States” without using gender as a
classification method, and the plurality opinion did not explain why
such “reliance on gender distinctions” was appropriate rather than
gender-neutral methods.195
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit came to the
same conclusion as the Supreme Court’s plurality and drew similar
disagreement from other members of the bench. Judge Wald wrote a
separate concurrence196 arguing that “there is a world of difference
between noting that men and women often fill different roles in society
and using these different roles as the justification for imposing inflexible
legal restrictions on one sex and not the other.”197 In logic later echoed
by Justice Ginsburg, Judge Wald did not object to any requirement
that an American-citizen parent establish their parentage before the
child turned eighteen years old, only to applying a one-gender
requirement that “clearly derive[d] from the stereotyping assumption
that mothers automatically will be close to their illegitimate children
whereas fathers will not.”198
Three years later, the Supreme Court heard a second challenge to
the same gendered distinction, revisiting the question in the wake of
even more appellate courts disagreeing as to whether the distinction
was impermissibly reliant on gendered stereotypes.199 Again, the case
was brought by the child of an American-citizen father and a noncitizen

192. Id. at 469.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 482–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 470 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196. Judge Wald noted that she was bound to concur due to the binding
precedent of Fiallo, discussed supra in notes 154–164, but called in her
concurrence for the Supreme Court or Congress to overrule or abrogate
Fiallo. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald,
J., concurring).
197. Id. at 1475.
198. Id. at 1476.
199. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001).
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mother, born outside of the United States.200 Tuan Anh Nguyen was
born in Vietnam to his Vietnamese mother, but moved to Texas when
he was five years old and was subsequently raised in America by his
American-citizen father.201 Although Nguyen became a lawful
permanent resident, his father did not legally establish his parentage
under the INA until Nguyen was twenty-eight years old, after
deportation proceedings had begun to remove Nguyen to Vietnam.202 In
contrast to Lorena Penero Miller, who lived in the Philippines until she
was at least twenty-one years old,203 Nguyen thus spent the vast
majority of his childhood years living with his American-citizen parent
in the United States.
Because Nguyen’s father had not established his parenthood before
Nguyen’s eighteenth birthday, however, he was deemed ineligible for
transmission of citizenship through his father. Justice Kennedy, writing
for a majority of the Court, held that the different statutory
requirements for transmitting the citizenships of unwed mothers versus
unwed fathers did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection.204 The Court again justified the gendered requirements
with the two familiar interests paralleling the unwed-father principles:
ensuring that a biological relationship existed between the Americancitizen parent and the child, and ensuring an opportunity for the
American-citizen parent and child to create a relationship.205
Again, the Court declared that birth itself inherently demonstrated
a biological connection between mother and child.206 By contrast, the
Court cited Lehr (itself quoting Caban) to support the proposition that
the father might not be present at the birth, and even if he was, his
physical presence did not demonstrate a biological connection to the
child.207 Justice Kennedy argued that fathers and mothers “are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood,”
and thus the additional requirement placed upon fathers “is neither
surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective.”208 To do
otherwise “would be to insist on a hollow neutrality.”209
200. Id. at 57.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 425 (1998).
204. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 56–59.
205. Id. at 62, 64–65.
206. Id. at 62, 64.
207. Id. at 62.
208. Id. at 63.
209. Id. at 64.
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Similarly, the Court reiterated Miller’s focus on the opportunity for
a relationship between American-citizen parent and child to develop
and transmit “the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between
child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”210 Justice
Kennedy focused on the mother’s “initial point of contact” with the
child at the time of birth, an opportunity that the father did not
necessarily have.211 Indeed, Justice Kennedy argued, there is no
guarantee that father and child would ever meet at all.212
Both Justices Kennedy and Stevens had a particular type of
American-citizen father in mind helping to animate this concern: U.S.
servicemembers stationed abroad. In Miller, Justice Stevens wrote that
Congress may have been motivated in part by concern “about a class
of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to
American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or be
known by, their children.”213 Justice Kennedy reiterated this population
in Nguyen, mentioning the “particular significance” of “young people,
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in
foreign countries.”214
Justice O’Connor dissented in Nguyen, and argued explicitly that
the majority opinion rested upon the same type of gendered stereotypes
that had been found unconstitutional in other contexts.215 Justice
O’Connor focused upon the importance Justice Kennedy placed on the
opportunity for an American-citizen parent and child to develop a
relationship rather than an actual relationship, as existed between
Nguyen and his father.216 Justice O’Connor pointed out the obvious,
that living in the United States and being raised by his Americancitizen parent since the age of five certainly created the relationship
that the majority opinion believed was Congress’s goal.217 This was not
important simply as a dramatic point regarding the family in question:
Justice O’Connor pointed out that “because we require a much tighter
fit between means and ends under heightened scrutiny, the availability
of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often highly
probative of the validity of the classification.”218 She argued that it was
“difficult to see how” focusing upon an opportunity to create a
210. Id. at 64–65.
211. Id. at 65.
212. Id. at 66.
213. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 439 (1998).
214. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
215. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 84.
217. Id. at 85.
218. Id. at 78.
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relationship and establishing that opportunity before the child’s
eighteenth birthday was significant for Congress’s alleged purposes
rather than showing that a parent-child relationship actually existed.219
Further, this focus on the opportunity to develop a relationship, rather
than a developed relationship itself, “would appear to rest only on an
overbroad sex-based generalization”220:
A mother may not have an opportunity for a relationship if the
child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged
abuse or neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by
tragedy, such as disaster or war, of the sort apparently present in
this case. There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that
fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a
relationship on similar terms.221

Significantly, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the descriptions
in both Miller and Nguyen of what was typical or probable might be
accurate as a descriptive matter yet still violate the Constitution.222 The
question, in O’Connor’s analysis, was not the accuracy of a stereotype,
or whether the stereotype demeaned the group it was applied to, but
whether the stereotype used gender as a proxy for “more germane bases
of classification.”223 If the goal of citizenship transmission was to grant
citizenship only to children who had a relationship with the Americancitizen parent that could transmit American culture and values, then
courts should ask whether that relationship existed, rather than rely
upon generalities and stereotypes about which gender of parent was
more likely to create such a relationship.224
Justice Kennedy rejected such a summary, arguing that to do so
would “fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—
such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father
need not be.”225 He believed that “[t]he distinction embodied in the
statutory scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception and
prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either class,” and thus did not
violate equal protection.226

219. Id. at 84.
220. Id. at 86.
221. Id. at 86–87.
222. Id. at 89–90.
223. Id. at 90 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726
(1982)).
224. Id. at 84–85.
225. Id. at 73 (Kennedy, J., majority).
226. Id. at 73.
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Multiple lessons can be drawn from this line of cases. First, it is
worth noting that the Court’s review of immigration statutes, including
the transmission of citizenship, is complicated by the plenary power
doctrine, instructing that the Court defer to Congress when it regulates
immigration.227 The Supreme Court in Fiallo v. Bell “emphasized that
‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”228 One of the reasons
that the Miller opinion only drew the support of a plurality of the Court
was that Justices disagreed about whether the topic was justiciable at
all.229 Although the Nguyen Court drew a majority of Justices,230 the
legacy of judicial deference in the area of immigration law is strong, if
not controlling.
With that said, however, it is striking that the Court’s logic rarely
relies upon the plenary power or otherwise refuses to engage with
substantive challenges to immigration laws in favor of simply deferring
to Congress. Instead, the Court grapples with the questions at hand,
imports the unwed-father principles from its family law doctrine, and
often relies upon those cases explicitly.
This reliance upon family law doctrine and reasoning appears in
modern cases despite the fact that societal and medical changes since
the 1970s and 1980s weaken the assumptions upon which the Court’s
logic rests. As Kerry Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti have pointed out,
the INA focuses on the “outdated and pernicious” reliance on “the
indelibility of blood” rather than functional relationships between
parents and children as the means of transmitting citizenship.231
Because of this, “the INA creates a perverse system in which children
of fathers who have been sued for child support are more likely to be
U.S. citizens than children of fathers who voluntarily care for and
support them.”232 Similarly, as discussed further below, the proxy of
gender for biological or genetic relationship is no longer accurate given
advances in medical technology, particularly international surrogacy
227. Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller
v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32 (1998).
228. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
229. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (“The complaint must be dismissed because the Court has no
power to provide the relief requested: conferral of citizenship on a basis
other than that prescribed by Congress.”).
230. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001).
231. Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 Va.
L. Rev. 629, 703 (2014).
232. Id. at 697.

574

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood

and fertility tourism.233 The factual assumptions of the Court’s family
law doctrine are by now outdated, yet the Court continues to rely upon
them. Were the Court to acknowledge these changes, the repeated
criticism in multiple dissents that the Court is using gender as a proxy
for another fact would be even stronger.
Finally, it is difficult to agree with the majority opinions that the
Court does not rely upon gendered stereotypes in immigration cases
imported from family law.234 The Court’s opinions repeatedly discuss
the perception that mothers are much more likely to be responsible for
their children, as opposed to absentee unwed fathers who may not even
be present at the birth. The Court even repeatedly cites the trope of
the American soldier having a sexual relationship with a local woman
while stationed abroad, then abandoning her and his child to return to
America.235
It is worth noting, moreover, that it is not simply gender
stereotypes that are embodied in immigration law. Kristin Collins has
uncovered a deeply racist dimension to the law of transmitting
citizenship that used gendered transmission to embody racial
preferences and stereotypes as well.236 As mentioned above, initially only
men were able to transmit American citizenship to their children, a
process consonant with coverture’s assumption that a husband was the
legal representation of both himself and the rest of his family.237 (Indeed,
historically American-citizen women could lose their citizenship if they
married a noncitizen.238) As women gained some legal independence
and, more importantly, as responsibility for unmarried children shifted
to women, laws were changed to allow American mothers to similarly

233. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby Without A Country: Determining
Citizenship for Assisted Reproduction Children Born Overseas, 91 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 335 (2014); Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma’am, Your Baby Is an
Alien: Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 12 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 47 (2010).
234. See generally Antognini, supra note 145, at 405 (discussing how the
citizenship transmission cases fit into the Supreme Court’s general
treatment of unwed parents in equal protection jurisprudence).
235. As only one example, consider the well-known opera, Madama Butterfly,
which depicts the suicide of the geisha Butterfly after Pinkerton, an
American Navy servicemember, impregnates and then abandons her.
Giacomo Puccini, Madama Butterfly (1904).
236. Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the
Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 Yale L.J. 2134,
2230 (2014).
237. Id. at 2230–31.
238. See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and
the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 405 (2005).
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transmit citizenship.239 As Congress adjusted which parents could
transmit citizenship, however, the differential treatment of the children
of American soldiers illustrates Collins’s point:
The disparate treatment of nonwhite children of servicemen
renders the Court’s formulation especially troubling. Congress
and the military marshaled extraordinary political and material
resources in order to bring the non-Asian brides and babies of
World War II soldiers home to the United States. Meanwhile,
military policies that prohibited and limited interracial marriage
between U.S. soldiers stationed in Asia and local women
frustrated the efforts of those servicemen who sought recognition
of, and American citizenship for, their children. This sorry history
calls into question the suggestion that a father’s lack of an
opportunity to bond with his child at birth can reasonably be
understood as a “biological inevitability.” Instead, it reveals the
limitation of citizenship transmission between the American
father and his nonmarital foreign-born child as the product of
choices of officials charged with enforcing and developing the rules
that governed membership in the polity—rules that were
constructed and construed in ways that tended to exclude
nonwhite children from citizenship.240

The tropes upon which the modern Court relies thus embody a
legacy of stereotype and prejudice. The Court’s opinions largely reject
criticism that they rely on gender stereotypes by taking issue with what
a gender stereotype is, arguing that stereotypes that are mostly
accurate based upon perceived biological difference and do not explicitly
demean one gender are constitutionally acceptable. The accuracy and
neutrality of these claims are debatable, of course. But it is clear that
the claims are fundamentally the same as the arguments first presented
in the Court’s family law cases.
The Court’s analysis of issues arising out of transmission of
citizenship is only one example of the impact of the Court’s family law
doctrine. The next section turns to another, in the context of
inheritance.
B.

Inheritance Law: Intestate Inheritance of Nonmarital Children

Inheritance law is a natural fit for some doctrinal crossover from
family law. The most familiar form of inheritance is from parent to
child, so establishing the link between parent and child is a central
question in many inheritance issues,241 and the influence from family
239. Id. at 2231–32.
240. Id. at 2232.
241. Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A
Different Path for Inheritance Law?, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 857, 858
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law in assessing who is a parent (and how parentage is proven) is
significant.242
As in family law and immigration law, a thorny issue for inheritance
law has been the different treatment of legitimate and illegitimate
children. Historically, having children outside of marriage was viewed
as morally wrong, and the law reflected this condemnation by treating
illegitimate children fundamentally differently than children of married
parents.243 The first question was thus whether any parent-child
relationship between an unwed parent and his or her child would be
recognized in any area of law. As American society evolved to be more
accepting of the increasing number of children born to unmarried
parents,244 scholars such as Harry Krause argued (with considerable
success) that the legal stigma of illegitimacy should be lessened.245
The earliest such cases did not arise in family law or inheritance
law, but in tort. The earliest cases challenging the legal stigma of
illegitimacy to be heard before the Supreme Court largely arose in the
context of rights between illegitimate children and their mothers.246 A
series of cases, for example, dealt with whether nonmarital children
could sue for the wrongful death of one of their parents, or whether
statutes permitting only marital children to bring such claims were
constitutional.247 Beginning in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court found
(2008). But see Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family
Support, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1835 (2014) (arguing that federal agencies
and courts impose federal definitions of family upon states in order to
privatize family dependency).
242. For example, after the Supreme Court established that the fundamental
right to marry encompassed same-sex spouses in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015), the question was immediately posed whether
the family law concept of the marital presumption would apply in the
context of inheritance. See Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance Law and the
Marital Presumption After Obergefell, 8 Est. Plan. & Community
Prop. L.J. 437 (2016).
243. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 Am.
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 347, 350 (2012).
244. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345, 347, 350 (2011).
245. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich.
L. Rev. 477 (1967).
246. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1968) (holding that
Louisiana law barring illegitimate child from suing for the wrongful death
of her mother was unconstitutional); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968) (holding that Louisiana statute barring
mother from suing for the wrongful death of her illegitimate daughter was
unconstitutional).
247. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that Texas statute
establishing duty of biological father to support legitimate but not
illegitimate children violated Equal Protection Clause); Weber v. Aetna
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a series of such statutes unconstitutional, explaining that it was
“illogical and unjust” to effectively punish children for the perceived
immorality of their parents.248
Even after the starkest refusals to recognize the parent-child links
if the parent was unmarried at the time of the child’s birth were ended,
the gendered dimensions of unwed parenthood continued to influence
questions of inheritance. In other words, one major step was simply to
say that nonmarital children should not be universally barred from
benefits and rights that marital children held, such as the ability to
bring a wrongful death suit upon the death of a parent. Once that line
was crossed, and the relationship between illegitimate child and parent
could be recognized, the obvious next question was who could be
identified as a nonmarital child’s parent (and how).
As is now familiar, nonmarital mothers were immediately identified
as a legal parent, whereas unmarried fathers were not. Continuing to
trace wrongful death claims, for example, the differential treatment has
continued. Even relatively recently children have been barred from
bringing wrongful death claims if the nonmarital father had not met
certain burdens during his lifetime, such as publicly acknowledging his
paternity.249 Reversing the factual basis of the claim, nonmarital fathers
are also often barred from bringing a wrongful death claim arising from
their child’s death if the father has not established his paternity under
state law, such as by creating a relationship with the child.250
An even clearer example, however, occurs in the context of
inheritance law asking when a nonmarital child may inherit from her
parent if the parent did not have a will when he or she died. One aspect
of statutes that have been repeatedly challenged is the same as in the
context of family law and immigration law: whether imposing different
burdens of proof of parentage upon fathers and mothers violates the
Constitution.

Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (holding that Louisiana statute
barring unacknowledged illegitimate children from recovering under
worker’s compensation laws for death of their fathers violated Equal
Protection Clause); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 533, 539–40 (1971)
(holding that Louisiana statute establishing that any wife, ascendants,
descendants, or other collateral relations inherited from intestate father
to the exclusion of illegitimate children did not violate Equal Protection
Clause). See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Illegitimacy:
Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchildren, 20 Am. U. J. Gender
Soc. Pol’y & L. 437 (2012).
248. See Appleton, supra note 243, at 354.
249. See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family,
56 Rutgers L. Rev. 73, 85 (2003).
250. See id. at 85–86.
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A second issue, however, is unique to inheritance law and
introduces additional dimensions of gendered stereotypes. One of the
principles of intestacy is to distribute the estate in the way that the
deceased person would have wanted. Statutes establishing who can
inherit from an intestate person, therefore, are a legislature’s perception
of the testator’s intent as to such categories of people.251
As a general rule, children born to unmarried mothers inherit if the
mother dies intestate—yet states impose additional requirements as to
an unmarried father’s actions during life to acknowledge or support his
child before such a child may inherit if the father dies intestate.252 Part
of the justification for such additional requirements is to establish the
nonmarital father’s paternity, but another part is that such fathers
would not want their children to inherit, logic that plays into the
second-stereotype unwed-father principle’s perception of unwed fathers
as uncommitted unless proven otherwise.
What evidence is sufficient to prove paternity for the purpose of
inheritance varies state by state. Some focus upon a prior legal
recognition of paternity, such as adjudications of paternity or formal
acknowledgments of paternity in something like a court filing.253 Such
adjudications sometimes, but not always, include agreements to provide
child support.254 A common requirement to establish nonmarital
paternity is that the father publicly recognized the child as his own
during the father’s lifetime,255 sometimes that the father acknowledged
the child and did not refuse to support the child.256
The Supreme Court heard a handful of cases challenging such
statutes under the Equal Protection Clause beginning in the late
1970s.257 The cases are complicated as they simultaneously raise two
potential equal protection concerns: one is the differential treatment of
a child’s relationship with unwed mothers versus fathers, but in
addition, children of unmarried parents are subject to different

251. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 L. &
Ineq. 1, 3 (2000).
252. Camille M. Davidson, Mother’s Baby, Father’s Maybe—Intestate
Succession: When Should a Child Born out of Wedlock Have a Right to
Inherit from or Through His or Her Biological Father?, 22 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 531, 534–35, 547–48 (2011).
253. See Maldonado, supra note 244, at 357.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 358.
256. Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of Gender and
Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women
& L. 129, 134–35 (2006).
257. See id. at 143.
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inheritance requirements than the children of married parents.258 Both
classifications on the basis of sex and on the basis of legitimacy trigger
heightened scrutiny under the Constitution, but the evaluation of what
goal the state is pursuing and how related the classification is to that
goal can vary considerably depending on whether the claim is framed
as legitimacy or gender.259 Regardless of the overlapping claims, the
inheritance challenges echo the very same unwed-father principles
discussed above: a concern for the proof of a biological relationship and
the existence of a parent-child relationship. The second concern is
magnified in the context of inheritance law by speculating as to the
unwed father’s intention for his child in a way that demonstrates the
power of the stereotype of unengaged, uninvolved unmarried fathers.
The first case arose when a man named Sherman Gordon was
murdered.260 At the time of his death, Gordon had been living with
Jessie Trimble for four years, along with their daughter Deta Mona
Trimble.261 Gordon acknowledged Deta as his daughter and was in
compliance with a child support order and an accompanying paternity
order concerning Deta.262
Had Gordon and Trimble been married, Gordon’s estate would
have passed to Deta.263 Because the two were unmarried, however, Deta
could not inherit: under Illinois law, illegitimate children inherited only
from intestate mothers, not their fathers.264 Deta argued that this
distinction violated the Equal Protection Clause as unconstitutional
classifications both on the basis of legitimacy and sex.265
The relevant provisions of the Illinois Probate Act had been
challenged before in Illinois courts, and the state had previously
explained the gender distinction by the fact that it was easy to establish
maternity through the fact of birth, as compared to a more difficult and
burdensome process of proving paternity.266 Additionally, the Illinois
Supreme Court had reasoned that the probate statute did not prevent
nonmarital children from inheriting, as they would inherit so long as

258. See id. at 144.
259. See id. at 146.
260. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 764–65.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 765.
266. Id. at 770.
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their father wrote a will.267 Any inability to inherit was therefore due to
the father’s choices, and not the state’s actions.
The Supreme Court struck down the Illinois law, primarily on the
basis that it imposed an unconstitutionally unequal burden on
illegitimate children who were effectively barred from inheriting from
an intestate father.268 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, also noted
Illinois’s argument regarding the intent of unwed fathers:
[A]ppellees urge us to affirm the decision below on the theory that
the Illinois Probate Act . . . mirrors the presumed intentions of
the citizens of the State regarding the disposition of their property
at death. Individualizing this theory, appellees argue that we
must assume that Sherman Gordon knew the disposition of his
estate under the Illinois Probate Act and that his failure to make
a will shows his approval of that disposition.269

The position of the state of Illinois was therefore that a man who
had lived with his child and helped raise her from her birth until his
death, who had been officially adjudicated as her father and was
meeting his child support obligation, who acknowledged her as his
daughter publicly, nonetheless indicated through his failure to write a
will that he intended to disinherit that same child.270 The Court said it
need not resolve whether such a presumed intent could justify
discrimination against illegitimate children, as such an intent was not
actually the goal of the Probate Act, but did not criticize the underlying
assumption.271
One year later, another intestate inheritance case came before the
court in Lalli v. Lalli.272 The case was brought by Robert and Maureen
Lalli, who claimed that they were the illegitimate children of Mario

267. Id. at 766 (citing In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234 (Ill. 1975)).
268. The Court declined to apply strict scrutiny; instead it held that the
statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if it is not
substantially related to permissible state interests. Id. at 766–67.
269. Id. at 774.
270. Id. Additionally, this assumes that the average Illinois father would be
aware of the legal requirement that he write a will rather than the
probably more realistic assumption that having been adjudicated as
Deta’s father, their relationship was clear and Deta would be able to
inherit whether he wrote a will nor not. This is, of course, ignoring the
even more basic question of how many Illinois parents have the resources
or knowledge to write a will, particularly when their estates are meager—
Gordon’s entire estate was a car. Id. at 764.
271. Id. at 774–75.
272. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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Lalli and an unnamed woman.273 Their mother had died in 1968, and
Mario Lalli died intestate in 1973.274 Mario’s widow Rosamond was the
executor of the estate and opposed their claims.275
Under New York law, an illegitimate child was deemed “the
legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his
father” if a court adjudicated the paternity of the father during the
pregnancy or within two years’ of the child’s birth.276 No such
adjudication took place during Mario’s lifetime, although Mario
apparently acknowledged that Robert and Maureen were his children,
including referring to Robert as “my son” in a notarized affidavit.277
Because the New York law barred Robert from inheriting, he challenged
the statute as discrimination against illegitimate children in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.278
Justice Powell again wrote for the Court to uphold New York’s law.
He argued that the New York law could be distinguished from the
unconstitutional law in Trimble v. Gordon, which was too broad a bar
against the inheritance of illegitimate children who were thus made
subject to an “exceptional burden.”279 By contrast, the Court described
the New York statute as an evidentiary requirement.280
The evidence required, of course, was a prescribed method of
establishing paternity, here to ensure that property was fairly and
efficiently distributed after someone’s death.281 In explaining why the
additional evidentiary burden was necessary for unwed fathers, Justice
Powell repeated the familiar explanation of the first unwed-father
principle: maternity is immediately established, as birth is recorded by
the state and generally takes place in front of witnesses.282 By contrast,
an unwed father might not be aware of and might not care about the
child, “because of the absence of any ties to the mother.”283 Justice
Powell noted that a father in a similar position as Mario Lalli, who
willingly acknowledged his illegitimate children, could simply waive any

273. Id. at 261.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 261–62.
277. Id. at 262–63.
278. Id. at 262.
279. Id. at 266–67 (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 267.
281. Id. at 267–68.
282. Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
283. Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
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defense to a paternity adjudication or begin the adjudication himself.284
It was constitutional, in any case, for New York to choose an
adjudication of paternity as the only method by which paternity could
be established for the purposes of inheritance.
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for the four Justices in minority,
found this profoundly unrealistic. His dissent began pointing out that
all of the interested parties in the case agreed that Robert Lalli was in
fact Mario’s son.285 The only reason Robert would not inherit was
because Mario, who had acknowledged and supported his son
throughout his life, had not separately instituted a paternity
adjudication against himself.286 Brennan pointed out some of the many
reasons that this expectation was particularly unrealistic for unwed
fathers who had already acknowledged their children and assumed
parental responsibilities:
Social welfare agencies, busy as they are with errant fathers, are
unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against fathers who
support their children. Similarly, children who are acknowledged
and supported by their fathers are unlikely to bring paternity
proceedings against them. First, they are unlikely to see the need
for such adversary proceedings. Second, even if aware of the rule
requiring judicial filiation orders, they are likely to fear provoking
disharmony by suing their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers
of such illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings against the
fathers. Finally, fathers who do not even bother to make out wills
(and thus die intestate) are unlikely to take the time to bring
formal filiation proceedings. Thus, as a practical matter, by
requiring judicial filiation orders entered during the lifetime of the
fathers, the New York statute makes it virtually impossible for
acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit
intestate.287

Four members of the Court acknowledged that the children of
fathers taking precisely the action deemed significant in the context of
family law—acknowledging their paternity and voluntarily assuming
roles as active fathers—were those most likely to be harmed by New
York’s requirement.288 Yet because the statute was cast as an
evidentiary requirement rather than as an absolute bar, it did not run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.

284. Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 278.
288. Id. at 277–78.
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Finally, in 1986 the Court decided Reed v. Campbell,289 which
largely retread Trimble’s holding. Texas law instituted virtually the
same requirement as the Illinois statute in Trimble: illegitimate children
could not inherit from their father unless the father and mother later
married each other.290 This requirement was plainly unconstitutional
after Trimble, but the deceased father in Reed died four months before
Trimble was issued.291 Texas argued that Trimble could not be applied
retroactively, and thus the child could not inherit. The Supreme Court
disagreed, as the child’s inheritance claim was filed after Trimble, and
thus the trial court had the case as precedent when evaluating her claim
to her intestate father’s estate.292
The Court’s analysis in challenges to intestate inheritance claims
brought by nonmarital children generally focuses upon the nonmarital
element of the child’s claim, that their inheritance right is significantly
different than it would have been had the parents been married. This
focus is certainly understandable, particularly since the effect of the
typical statute is to punish a child for the choices of adults over whom
the child has absolutely no control.293 But the cases also hold the seeds
of the unwed-father principles that the family law cases, arising nearly
contemporaneous with the inheritance cases, developed into a full
theory justifying differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers.
Moreover, because the first-order problem of inheritance cases has to
do with legitimacy, the Court fails to interrogate the second-order
problem of gender stereotypes, and instead leaves them as unquestioned
assumptions.
The first biological unwed-father principle, that fathers are harder
to identify than mothers who are present at birth, operated in the
inheritance cases as justifying an efficient method of property
distribution.294 This might have been true in the 1970s, but is no longer
so today—indeed, Paula Monopoli argues that a better intestacy regime
would be to assume that if the child can prove a genetic link, then the
child can inherit from that nonmarital parent, and any nonmarital
parent who does not like that default may write a will.295
The second-stereotype unwed-father principle, that unwed fathers
are generally unwilling and unlikely to take on responsibility for their
289. 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
290. Id. at 853 & n. 2.
291. Id. at 853.
292. Id. at 853, 856.
293. See Maldonado, supra note 244, at 358.
294. See supra Part II.B; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); Appleton, supra note 243, at 358.
295. Monopoli, supra note 241, at 875–76, 881–88.
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children, motivated Illinois’s argument that intestacy statutes
excluding nonmarital children are simply expressing the presumed
intent of the nonmarital fathers. The stricter requirements in Illinois
and Texas reinforced another dimension of this assumption: the way an
unmarried father could demonstrate his commitment to his child was
not through supporting the child or developing a relationship with the
child, but by marrying the mother.296
Immigration and inheritance law are hardly the only fields of law
where gender stereotypes about fathers and mothers motivate gendered
differences in the law. They are two of the clearest examples, however,
of how and why the constitutional doctrine accepting such stereotypes
as unproblematic reverberates throughout the law in ways that make
that doctrine harmful even as state-level parentage statutes have moved
beyond it. The next Part explains a methodology and substantive
principles as to how the doctrine can and should change, through a
modern reevaluation of the Equal Protection claims.

III. Constitutionalizing Fatherhood: Taking Equal
Protection and Gendered Parenthood Seriously
The Court’s approval of different treatment of unwed mothers and
fathers may seem like a relatively narrow field with few real-world
consequences, but the previous Part has illustrated two examples of
how the assumptions underlying the Court’s reasoning underlie other
gendered distinctions in different areas of law. These assumptions
should be revisited in the context of family law so that a beneficial
conceptual impact can spread in the same fashion: a firm statement of
gender-neutral parenting rules will undercut gendered distinctions in
other fields of law. Parentage statutes should be reevaluated under the
Equal Protection Clause and found unconstitutional to the extent that
they treat unwed fathers and mothers differently.
One justification for revisiting the parentage cases could simply be
that the assumptions have been proven inaccurate. The unwed-father
principles are simply obsolete, given changes to modern society and
medical developments. The first principle, that biological mothers are
easy to identify at the moment of birth whereas fathers are not, is
certainly no longer true given the rise of egg donation and surrogacy
and the much easier process of genetic testing to identify a father.
Furthermore, the focus upon pregnancy as the moment that a
biological mother is identified highlights the problem of pregnancy
exceptionalism. Feminist scholars have roundly criticized the idea that
some classifications based on sex are justified by benign biological

296. See Appleton, supra note 243, at 359; Murray, supra note 139, at 389–90.
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differences and are thus unproblematic.297 For too long, courts have
treated pregnancy as synonymous with motherhood. This obscures
adoptive parents, intended parents having children through surrogacy,
female partners of pregnant women, and fathers as equal parents. The
idea that the pregnant woman is the first parent, and any others might
be added through additional rules, is both medically and socially no
longer tenable.
The second unwed-father principle, the stereotype that men are
reluctant to become fathers, is similarly harmful. Over and over the
Court points to biological differences (pregnancy and the moment of
birth) to justify stereotypes about fathers as unwilling parents who
must be pressured or coerced into parenthood, as opposed to mothers
who are constitutional mothers from the moment they give birth.
It is not enough, however, to simply revisit the question of unwed
fathers’ constitutional rights and find that the unwed-father principles
are less accurate than previous Courts believed.298 In order to treat
fathers as equal constitutional parents—in order to constitutionalize
fathers in a way they currently are not—the frame of analysis must be
the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, recent Supreme Court
precedent indicates a path as to how to do so. The next Section outlines
the theory of such a claim.
A.

How to Constitutionalize Fathers

The constitutional status of a parent is, if taken in the abstract, a
fundamental liberty right. Yet, to describe the problem of differential
recognition of the constitutional status of unwed fathers and mothers
as purely a fundamental rights question does not address the actual
harm. Most obviously, unwed biological fathers have not been
categorically excluded from parentage, so the problem is not a wholesale
exclusion. Instead, legal parentage as a fundamental right is a bit of a
catch-22: in order to be identified as a legal parent, a person must have
a statute identifying them as such. But in order to challenge a state
action as violating their rights as a parent, or not recognizing their
rights as a parent, they must be a legal parent. This was the dilemma
297. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1, 39 (1995); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 270 (1992).
298. Nancy Dowd has pointed out the impact that societal conceptions of
masculinity have upon caregiving responsibilities. See Nancy E. Dowd,
Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 45 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 1047, 1052–59, 1062–66 (2012). Examining only the accuracy of
stereotypes thus misses forces causing the stereotypes to play out in real
life. See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 523,
526–30 (1996).
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in which Michael H. found himself, when the Court rejected his
assertion of a fundamental right:
Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that,
because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria,
protection of Gerald’s and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient
state interest to support termination of that relationship. This
argument is, of course, predicated on the assertion that Michael
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship
with Victoria.299

Justice Scalia then concluded that because men in Michael’s
position had not previously been statutorily identified as legal fathers,
Michael could not plausibly claim a fundamental right as father.300
Extending a fundamental right to people who have previously not been
granted that right or status under statutes is an uphill battle, at least
to those Justices who share Justice Scalia’s view of fundamental rights.
Equal protection analysis, however, need not focus upon who has
traditionally held fundamental rights, or even map out all of the
dimensions of a fundamental right. In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice
Kennedy explained that previous cases “inquired about the right . . . in
its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for
excluding the relevant class from the right.”301 Considering the
importance of legal parentage, is there a sufficient justification for
treating unwed biological fathers differently than unwed biological
mothers?
This question more accurately addresses the harm caused by
differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. Framing gendered
treatment of parents as an equal protection problem addresses the
gender stereotypes underlying the family law cases that impact other
areas such as immigration and inheritance law. If the sole change to
constitutional analysis is viewed as the fundamental right to the care
of your children, then the change would echo only in family law. It is
both more accurate and more effective, therefore, to focus on the equal
protection claim.
Obergefell, the 2015 case establishing that the fundamental right to
marry must be granted to same-sex couples,302 demonstrates both the
potential problem and the promise of choosing which claim leads when
both fundamental rights and equal protection issues are implicated.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion begins by noting the “transcendent

299. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989).
300. Id. at 123–24.
301. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
302. Id. at 2607.
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importance of marriage,”303 but immediately notes that marriage is
characterized by both “continuity and change”304 alongside societal
evolution. Moreover, Justice Kennedy cites not simply changes in the
legal definition and societal understanding of marriage, but also changes
in legal and societal treatment of LGBTQ people.305
Justice Kennedy then turned fully to the right to marry, reading
past cases describing marriage as a fundamental right to identify
“essential attributes” of the right.306 He outlined four principles and
traditions of marriage that form the core of its importance as a
fundamental right and reasoned that the four principles applied “with
equal force to same-sex couples.”307
Denying the fundamental right to marry had inescapable equality
dimensions in the eyes of the Court: because marriage was such an
important social institution, refusing to allow same-sex couples to
marry signaled the inequality of those couples,308 imposing “stigma and
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”309 Justice Kennedy
further explained the link between the fundamental right and equality:
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more
accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may
converge in the identification and definition of the right. This
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of
what freedom is and must become.310

Evolutions in societal understandings, Justice Kennedy argued,
meant that the Equal Protection Clause could “reveal unjustified
inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed
303. Id. at 2594.
304. Id. at 2595.
305. Id. at 2595–97.
306. Id. at 2598.
307. Id. at 2599–601.
308. Id. at 2601–02.
309. Id. at 2602.
310. Id. at 2602–03 (citations omitted).
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unnoticed and unchallenged.”311 After giving several examples of past
cases striking down sex-based classifications within marriage, which
Justice Kennedy described as demonstrating the “interlocking nature of
these constitutional safeguards,”312 he argued:
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of
same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they
abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws
enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex
couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples
and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially
against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this
denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave
and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays
and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.313

Justice Kennedy concluded by referencing both threads of
constitutional analysis, finding that “the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty.”314 The sentence that arguably most clearly gives a
holding for the decision, however, only says that “same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry.”315
Many early reactions to Obergefell read the decision to rely solely
on the Due Process Clause and marriage as a fundamental right. Some
advocates criticized the narrowness of Justice Kennedy’s focus, and
advocates fighting for LGBTQ equality in other areas immediately
attempted to cabin its application to marriage alone.316 Even though
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court discussed the stigma of not allowing
people to marry their same-sex partners and how this demeaned any
deviation from heterosexual norms, some states felt empowered to argue
that the case did not apply to statutes barring same-sex couples from
adopting, reasoning that the involvement of children took that issue
out of Obergefell’s ambit.317 Notably, the Supreme Court apparently
311. Id. at 2603.
312. Id. at 2604.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 2604–05.
316. Collins, supra note 150, at 199–200.
317. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Serv.’s, No. 3:15-cv-578DPJ-FKB, 2015 WL 5925931 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 11, 2015) (“In contrast to
the fundamental right to marriage at issue in Obergefell, it is well-settled
that Mississippi’s adoption laws confer a statutory privilege, not a
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disagreed with such a narrow reading, citing Obergefell to find in a per
curiam opinion that states could not apply the marital presumption
only to opposite-sex spouses.318
If that limitation is Obergefell’s danger, the case also provides a
methodological approach to cases involving unequal applications of
fundamental rights. Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly and repeatedly
relies upon the Equal Protection Clause, the significance of the unequal
availability of a fundamental right, and the message that denying a
fundamental right to a specific group sends.
Justice Kennedy also draws significant support from how changing
societal and broader legal norms can help to identify such unequal
treatment of fundamental rights. This signals what Courtney Joslin has
called “dynamic constitutionalism,” reflecting “legal, cultural, and
social developments.”319 Justice Kennedy embraced this dynamism,
explaining that “[w]hen new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim
to liberty must be addressed.”320
Some key questions to answer in the context of the constitutional
rights of unwed biological fathers can thus be drawn from Obergefell’s
method: has legal and societal understanding of parenting and the
parent-child relationship changed in the last few decades in a way that
reveals unjustified inequality? What about parenting makes it a
fundamental right, and are any of those characteristics central only to
mothers and married fathers? What messages does it send to treat
unwed biological fathers so differently under the Due Process Clause?
Another more recent Supreme Court case helps to answer these
questions. In 2017, the Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
again addressing a dimension of citizenship transmission.321 The lawsuit
challenged a sub-issue: rather than facially challenging the greater
burden placed upon unwed biological fathers to legitimate their children
before a certain age, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana challenged residency
requirements applied to American-citizen fathers.322 At the time that
the statute was applied to his father, an American-citizen father had to
be physically present in the United States for ten years, five of which

fundamental constitutional right to adopt protected by the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses. . . . Section 93-17-3(5) likewise does not
implicate any fundamental due process right to ‘family integrity.’”).
318. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
319. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage,
97 B.U. L. Rev. 425, 454 (2017).
320. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 2598 (2015).
321. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
322. Id. at 1687.

590

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood

had to be after the age of fourteen.323 Americancitizen, unwed mothers,
however, could transmit citizenship if they had lived in the United
States for only one year.324 The facts were particularly dramatic in the
case: José Morales, Morales-Santana’s father, had lived in Puerto Rico
for his entire life, but moved to the Dominican Republic (and thus
outside of the United States, although he moved to take a job with an
American company) a mere twenty days before his nineteenth
birthday.325 Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic to
Morales and Yrma Santana Montilla, with whom Morales had been
living for three years.326 Morales and Montilla married when MoralesSantana was eight years old, and Morales-Santana’s birth certificate
was amended to list Morales as his father.327 Morales-Santana moved to
the United States when he was thirteen years old, and lived there for
twenty-five years until he was placed in removal proceedings.328 Had
Morales moved from Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic three
weeks later, Morales-Santana would have been eligible to receive
American citizenship through his father. Similarly, had Morales been
the mother, instead of the father, Morales-Santana would have been
eligible to receive American citizenship, as the statute required only one
year of physical presence in the United States for a mother to be able
to pass American citizenship on to her child.329 Because of the gendered
difference in the physical presence requirement, however, MoralesSantana was not eligible to receive American citizenship as the child of
an American citizen and was ordered removed by an immigration judge
to the Dominican Republic.330
The Second Circuit reversed the immigration judge’s decision and
held that the gendered physical presence requirements violated the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.331 This created a
circuit split with the Ninth Circuit,332 in a case that the Supreme Court

323. Id.
324. Id. at 1686.
325. Id. at 1687.
326. Id. at 1688.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1687.
330. Id. at 1688.
331. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 523–24 (2d Cir. 2015).
332. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564
U.S. 210 (2011).
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heard but split evenly as to the result, thus affirming the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.333
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Morales-Santana,
immediately focuses on the heart of the substantive equality issue: that
the gendered physical presence requirement and other such gendered
differences “date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife
with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are.”334
She criticized the past justifications of such laws as reliant upon the
“familiar stereotype” that unwed fathers “would care little about, and
have scant contact with, their nonmarital children.”335 By contrast, the
“unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a non-marital
child.”336 Justice Ginsburg described such stereotypes as “stunningly
anachronistic,” particularly as compared with the modern equal
protection doctrine applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based
classifications.337
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion does not address the gendered
distinction at the heart of unwed parent cases.338 The case deals only
with the physical presence requirement,339 and Justice Ginsburg
contrasts the requirement for unwed mothers and “fathers who have
accepted parental responsibility,” not unwed fathers generally.340
Further, although the Court found that the gendered physical presence
requirement violated the Constitution,341 Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the Court could not prevent Morales-Santana’s removal by

333. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (Kagan, J., recused).
334. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689.
335. Id. at 1692.
336. Id. at 1691.
337. Id. at 1693.
338. Id. at 1694 (“Unlike the paternal-acknowledgment requirement at issue in
Nguyen and Miller, the physical-presence requirements now before us
relate solely to the duration of the parent’s prebirth residency in the
United States, not to the parent’s filial tie to the child.”).
339. Id. Justice Ginsburg noted that Morales-Santana “does not renew the
contest over [the] paternal-acknowledgment requirement . . . , and the
Government does not dispute that Morales-Santana’s father, by marrying
Morales-Santana’s mother, satisfied that requirement.” Id. Note, however,
Albertina Antonigni’s perceptive interrogation of why fathers and mothers
would need a different physical presence requirement, tying the residency
requirement to a perception of mothers as present and fathers as absent.
Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers
Abroad and at Home, 36 Harv. J. L. & Gender 405, 447–49 (2013).
340. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693 (emphasis added).
341. Id. at 1698.
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granting him citizenship.342 Instead, the Court “level[ed] down”343 by
declaring that the longer physical presence requirement must be applied
to all American-citizen parents, rather than only to fathers.344
Despite the limited holding and relief, however, the Court’s opinion
gives considerable guidance to the evaluation of constitutional parental
rights. Historical gendered treatment of fathers and mothers was
referred to as “the once entrenched principle of male dominance in
marriage,”345 a legacy that has been formally eliminated through
Obergefell’s grant of marriage equality to same-sex couples.346 Justice
Ginsburg cited her opinion in United States v. Virginia347 to reiterate
the Court’s “suspicion” of “overbroad generalizations” about genders.348
Generalization about domestic roles creates “a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that force[s] women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver,”349 and “disserve[s] men who exercise
responsibility for raising their children.”350
Even in a decision of limited scope, therefore, Morales-Santana
provides some of the substance to fill out Obergefell’s methodology.
Obergefell identifies a fundamental right and asks whether the
classification in question has any relationship to the right that would
justify limiting the right’s availability consonant with the Equal
Protection Clause. Morales-Santana points to the gendered stereotypes
traditionally used to treat mothers and fathers differently and rejects
them as illegitimate and violating equal protection. The principle is
clear: differential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers is
unconstitutional under the equal protection principles of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. To treat unwed parents differently according
to their sex is an impermissible use of stereotype as a proxy for
unrelated government interests. Such different treatment, be it in
family law, immigration law, inheritance law, or others, must be
rejected.

342. Id.
343. See Collins, supra note 150, at 175.
344. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701.
345. Id. at 1691.
346. Morales-Santana was the first case post-Obergefell addressing nonmarital
families. See Collins, supra note 150, at 174, 199–200.
347. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
348. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
349. Id. at 1693 (quoting Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
736 (2003)).
350. Id.
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This approach acknowledges the fundamental right of the parentchild relationship but does not rely upon only the fundamental right to
challenge differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. By
explicitly framing the question under the Equal Protection Clause, the
gendered stereotypes upon which the differential treatment rests can be
addressed directly: the unequal treatment of unwed fathers and mothers
reflects outdated legal and social understandings.
Obergefell’s identification of the core of a right can also be
performed as to parentage in a way that further flags the unequal
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. Statutory parental laws are
surprisingly inconsistent in identifying what parents are good parents
or why parents are important.351 The Supreme Court gives some more
guidance in its cases addressing the fundamental rights of parents,
reinforcing a few different values.
A key thread is the importance of transmitting values and
knowledge to one’s children. A number of the earliest parental rights
cases arose in the context of laws regulating schools, so it is unsurprising
that the Court repeatedly discussed the importance of “the power of
parents to control the education of their own,”352 to “direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control,”353 and “give
[their] children education suitable to their station in life.”354 The
importance of educating children as to values was also emphasized, such
as “the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship”355 and “[t]he rights of children to exercise their
religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage
them in the practice of religious belief[.]”356 Parents provide this
education to equip their children for the “additional obligations”357 of
adulthood.
Another common concern is the ability of parents to establish a
private home, seeing decisions made within the home about the family
as an extension of the broader right to privacy. Raising children is seen

351. Purvis, supra note 4, at 217–22.
352. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
353. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
354. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
355. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
356. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
357. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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as paired with “establish[ing] a home,”358 and as part of the “freedom
of personal choice in matters of family life.”359
Interestingly, in the context of a potential termination of the
parental right, the Court concluded that “[e]ven when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing
the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”360 To some extent
preventing the destruction of their family life underlies a number of the
parental rights cases—for example, although a statute requiring the
public schooling of Amish children longer than their parents wished
primarily discussed the right of parents to control their children’s
education, the perceived danger of the additional years of public
schooling included a sense that the state was replacing its own
judgment for that of the parents and teaching the children values
contrary to those their parents would choose.361 Yet the relevance of
strained blood relationships nonetheless generating a vital interest in
preserving family relationships is particularly pointed when considering
the constitutional rights of unwed biological fathers.362
The Court has summarized these principles as “[t]he fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child,”363 later slightly paraphrased as the “care, custody, and
control of their children.”364 It is clear that these principles have nothing
to do with the gender of the parent involved, nor with whether the
parents are married. Nothing about the fundamental right justifies
limiting the right to married parents and unwed mothers. The result of
the differentiation is to underscore gendered stereotypes that men do
not want to be fathers and do not want to be engaged parents. This is
unconstitutionally unequal.
B.

Implementation

Treating fathers and mothers equally results in a single principle
when evaluating parentage statutes: they must be provided equal
opportunity to assert and prove legal parentage. This does not mean
that any single parentage rule must be used to the exclusion of other
358. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
359. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212–15.
362. Note, however, that Katharine Baker has argued that progressive
attempts to eliminate the legal stigma of illegitimacy unintentionally
overemphasized biological connections between parents and children, in a
manner that today can harm nontraditional families. See Katharine K.
Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1647,
1682 & n.192 (2015).
363. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
364. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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rules. Indeed, equalizing parentage between fathers and mothers allows
states to continue their statutory reform and enables states to be
flexible in adapting parentage rules to new technologies and new family
formation norms. The consequence of the principle equalizes rules
between fathers and mothers and is not about prioritizing biology or
function over others in defining the fundamental right of parentage.
Applying equal protection principles to parentage statutes also does
not mean that all fathers must be treated the same as all mothers in all
circumstances. For example, equal protection does not mean that giving
birth to a child cannot be one method by which legal parentage might
be established. It does, however, mean that the fact that most mothers
give birth to their children cannot become a proxy rule applying to all
mothers and all fathers. If pregnancy and giving birth is a relevant fact,
then statutes must use that fact and not a sex or gender.
Furthermore, to the extent that pregnancy is used, the legislative
body using pregnancy as a rule of parentage must be clear about why.
If pregnancy is used as shorthand for a genetic connection to the child,
then nonpregnant parents must be allowed an opportunity to show their
own genetic connection and be treated as equal with the pregnant
parent. If pregnancy is used as a proxy for an opportunity to have a
relationship with the child, then the nonpregnant parent who is present
at birth must be treated as equal with the pregnant parent.
Application of equal protection does not mean that one rule or
theory of parentage must be applied above others, such as genetic
connection outweighing functional theories. Changes to medical
technologies, social realities, and laws affecting the regulation of families
in other areas make identifying legal parents in a way that is helpful
and progressing along with American families a moving target.
As mentioned earlier, rules of parentage such as the marital
presumption can easily be applied in a gender-neutral manner, and
progressive application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples
has made it easier for female spouses of women who give birth to be
identified as the second legal mother from the time of birth. Equalizing
parentage rules between men and women would also provide more
avenues for fathers in same-sex relationships, as well as all unwed
partners.
There is one group of parents that could be negatively affected:
adoptive parents, at least those who adopt with only the consent of an
unmarried mother. This is a relatively small group for practical
purposes, since unmarried fathers have more avenues to assert their
legal parentage under state law than before. There are some
circumstances, however, where an infant could be placed for adoption
without the father’s knowledge or consent, either because the father is
unaware of the pregnancy or because the mother took advantage of a
safe haven law. Such laws establish locations where infants can be safely
abandoned into the custody of the state without the abandoning parent
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being charged with neglect.365 Crucially, however, the laws are gender
neutral: they do not establish that only mothers may leave children in
such safe havens, nor that the father’s consent is unnecessary. Such
laws thus do not necessarily present an equal protection problem, but
rather a question of whether the ability of one parent to relinquish a
child without identifying the other parent violates the fundamental
right of the other parent.
The advantage of dynamic constitutionalism is that it allows courts
to acknowledge application of core rights to novel and changing
scenarios, and application of equal protection does nothing to change
that. Application of equal protection also allows for experimentation
between states as well as different policy goals to justify different rules
at the state versus federal level. But whatever theories of parentage
Congress or state legislatures apply, they must not use sex or gender
stereotypes as a proxy for nongendered facts.
C.

Potential Objections

As a first line response, there are many self-identified feminist
scholars who argue that differential treatment of mothers and fathers
is appropriate or desirable for the law. Mary Becker described “a
conspiracy of silence [that] forbids discussion of what is common
knowledge: mothers are usually emotionally closer to their children than
fathers”366 in the context of arguing that courts should defer to a
mother’s decision as to custody arrangements for children at divorce.367
Katharine Silbaugh wrote of her concern that constitutionalizing a
formal equality approach would prevent experimentation with
parentage rules, potentially including maternalist perspectives and
rules.368 This perspective is obviously fundamentally at odds with this
Article’s thesis, that unwed fathers and mothers should be treated
equally under the law in parentage determinations. The thesis, however,
is a feminist one: to the extent that parentage laws underscore gender
stereotypes, particularly the second-stereotype unwed-father principle
that men are unwilling fathers, those gender stereotypes are also
wielded against women. The argument that women are more natural or
more skilled mothers, in other words, supports propositions that women
be encouraged or coerced to take on more caregiving responsibilities,
that women’s economic activity is less important than their caregiving
365. Purvis, supra note 142, at 678.
366. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 133, 137 (1992).
367. Id. at 139. Becker acknowledged that fathers could perform similar
caregiving work and potentially form emotionally close relationships with
their children but referred to those fathers as “mother[ing].” Id. at 150.
368. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems of
Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1156 (1999).
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activities, and that the historical division of labor pushing men towards
the workforce and women towards the home has roots in truth rather
than mere stereotype. In my previous work, I have identified myself as
a social constructionist feminist scholar, and this argument continues
my work in that vein.369 This may not convince feminists who support
differential gendered treatment, but at least the basis of our
disagreement is clear.
A second vein of criticism is best represented by Jennifer Hendricks,
who has criticized what she terms “genetic essentialism” in laws
regulating parentage, meaning “an emphasis on genes as the essence of
parenthood.”370 Hendricks argues that existing treatment of unwed
biological fathers “already accommodates men’s unique biology” more
than women’s, so equality between the sexes does not require
incorporating a genetic relationship into the legal or constitutional
definition of parentage.371 As Hendricks explains, “[a]s a matter of
formal sex equality, a genetic tie alone need not confer parental rights.
As the Supreme Court has held, the man with a merely genetic tie is
not similarly situated to the woman who has given birth.”372 As
discussed above, however, Hendricks is factually correct: being pregnant
and giving birth to a child, while usually occurring simultaneously with
being the genetic mother of a child, is not necessarily the case. A
gestational surrogate is clearly not similarly situated with a man whose
sperm was used to create the fetus. To the extent that one is persuaded
that genetic essentialism is a harm, that speaks to the substance of
parentage laws and whether any genetic connection to a child should
be included. It does not determine, however, whether existing laws treat
men and women equally. I argue that it would be constitutional, in
other words, for a state to create a parentage scheme that eliminated
genetic ties entirely, as long as each substantive rule is not used as an
imperfect proxy for gender.
Another concern argues that strengthening fathers’ constitutional
rights gives fathers increased power in custody fights in a way that will
harm both women and children. Status as a legal parent does not
guarantee that a parent receives custody or visitation rights with a
child, but it allows the parent to ask (and potentially to fight) for
custody or visitation rights. Attempts to constitutionalize the custody
fight itself have been unsuccessful,373 so at the moment status as a legal
369. Purvis, supra note 142, at 688–92.
370. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic
Entitlement, 91 Tul. L. Rev. 473, 486 (2017).
371. Id. at 495.
372. Id. at 497.
373. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents,
34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1461 (2006).
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parent effectively operates as a gatekeeper for further conflict: legal
parentage act as standing to further pursue parental rights.374 June
Carbone and Naomi Cahn have argued that unmarried parents have
potentially chosen not to marry because the mother recognizes the
presumption that married parents are equal parents in the eyes of the
law and wants to avoid it.375 The rights of married parents tend to be
one-size-fits-all,376 whereas unmarried couples have a range of
relationship models. Carbone and Cahn argue that:
[C]ourts increasingly impose such shared parenting arrangements
on couples who barely know each other, disagree fundamentally
on how to parent, and often cannot stand to be in the same room
together; or, even if they cooperate perfectly well, they have
simply elected that their co-parenting relationship consist of
different terms from those the law would ordinarily impose.377
To the extent that recognizing more unwed biological fathers as
legal fathers imposes those terms on more families, not only would
the perceived choices of the mothers be disregarded, but such
conflict would be magnified among parents with resources to fight
over custody and visitation in court.378

Such concerns are significant, since there is no question that
recognizing more legal parents at the very least opens the door to more
custody fights and a prolonged legal relationship between two parents
who may not want to have any relationship with each other.
Acknowledging the breadth of the equality concern, however, indicates
that the question of custody may be a narrower one. The solution may
be reforms to how custody is determined, in other words, rather than
continuing to grant more mothers than fathers constitutional rights.
Several family law scholars in recent years have been questioning
whether it makes sense to treat parental rights and responsibilities as a
single, indivisible package, as opposed to a “bundle of sticks” that might
be broken apart.379
374. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev. 55, 74–
79 (2016); see also Margaret Ryznar, The Empirics of Child Custody, 65
Clev. St. L. Rev. 211, 227–28 (2017).
375. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of
Unintentional Parenthood, 7 UC Irvine L. Rev. 511, 543 (2017).
376. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 374, at 107.
377. Id. at 58.
378. Cf. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 375, at 514 (describing the difference
between traditional reproduction and assisted reproductive technologies
as between “‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ reproduction”).
379. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. Rev.
127, 148–49 (2018); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating
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Another potential danger is that, by equalizing the treatment of
unwed fathers and mothers, it will become more difficult for unwed
mothers to be identified as legal parents rather than easier for unwed
fathers to do so. This would have particularly harmful consequences in
cases involving the transmission of citizenship and inheritance, where
by the time a case arises the clock of parental identification has already
run out. Such a remedy would be the leveling down seen in Sessions v.
Morales-Santana,380 rather than leveling up to recognize more parentchild links.
In Morales-Santana, however, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the
Court could not impose a shorter physical presence requirement upon
fathers because that would not have been the intent of Congress.381 Such
logic might similarly be imposed in the context of other transmission of
citizenship cases, which would have to be addressed by Congress. Such
an intent—to find fewer legal parents, leaving children with fewer
sources of support and reliant on the public fix—seems much less
plausible in the context of family law and inheritance law cases. If the
differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers rests upon
stereotyped views of men as unwilling fathers, it is more logical for
courts to reject the stereotype, rather than impose that stereotype upon
mothers as well.
There are also broader criticisms of the expanding
constitutionalization of family law. Scholars have argued that
constitutionalizing family law disadvantages vulnerable family
members382 as well as unconventional family structures.383 Others,
however, have argued that family law is already constitutional––that,
even in law school, famous constitutional law cases arising out of family

Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple
Parents, 9 J. L. & Fam. Stud. 309, 313 (2007).
380. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
381. Id. at 1700.
382. Meyer, supra note 27, at 554.
383. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight And Gay) Marriage:
Valuing All Families Under The Law 5–6 (2008); Katherine M.
Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 236, 242–43 (2006); Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s
Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 28–30
(2015); Joslin, supra note 319, at 440–43; Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake
of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both
Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. City L. Rev. 573, 586 (2005); Melissa Murray,
Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 1207,
1255 (2016); see generally Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and
(or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 547 (2015)
(focusing on United States v. Windsor, pre-Obergefell).
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law questions are not viewed as family law.384 The rich history of
constitutional family law is cast as “establish[ing] boundaries or outer
limits for permissible family laws,”385 which contributes to devaluing
family law itself,386 when in fact family law is already constitutionalized.
Family law is in a dialogic relationship with constitutional law, in which
the evolution of family law helped to evolve constitutional law, not the
reverse.387

Conclusion
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit its family law cases from the
1970s that established a starkly different constitutional status for
unwed biological fathers as compared to unwed biological mothers. One
reason may be that few such cases arise, after state legislatures amended
their parentage statutes to eliminate some of the most explicit
differentiations that sparked previous constitutional challenge.
The impact of the Court’s family law doctrine, however, is still
vibrant today. The unwed-father principles have significantly impacted
immigration and inheritance law, among others. A core rejection of
equality principles as applied to parents continues to operate within
broader constitutional challenges to laws touching upon the family in
all sorts of contexts, operating to treat unwed biological fathers as less
significant under the Constitution.
If the broader impact of the Court’s family law doctrine is the why,
then recent cases demonstrate the how, illustrating how future courts
should analyze questions that implicate both fundamental and equality
rights. Only once courts revisit the equality claims of unwed biological
fathers and reject the gendered views of the past will unwed biological
fathers truly become constitutional fathers.

384. Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family
Law, 129 Harv. L. Rev. F. 197, 206 (2016).
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St. L.J. 919, 963 (2016).
386. Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 623, 636 (2014).
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